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ARRESTS AS REGULATION 
Eisha Jain* 
For some arrested individuals, the most important consequences of their ar-
rest arise outside the criminal justice system. Arrests alone—regardless of wheth-
er they result in conviction—can lead to a range of consequences, including de-
portation, eviction, license suspension, custody disruption, or adverse employ-
ment actions. But even as courts, scholars, and others have drawn needed 
attention to the civil consequences of criminal convictions, they have paid rela-
tively little attention to the consequences of arrests in their own right. This Article 
aims to fill that gap by providing an account of how arrests are systemically used 
outside the criminal justice system. Noncriminal justice actors who rely on ar-
rests—such as immigration enforcement officials, public housing authorities, em-
ployers, licensing authorities, and child protective service providers, among oth-
ers—routinely receive and use arrest information for their own objectives. They 
do so not because arrests are the best regulatory tools but because they regard 
arrests as proxies for information they value, and because arrests are often easy 
and inexpensive to access. But when noncriminal justice actors rely on arrests, 
they set off a complicated and poorly understood web of interactions with the 
criminal justice system. Regulatory bodies and others that make decisions based 
on arrests can coordinate and pool resources with prosecutors and police offic-
ers, achieving a level of enforcement that neither could achieve alone, or they can 
make decisions that undermine important aspects of the criminal justice process. 
This Article maps different regulatory interactions based on arrests and illus-
trates the need for greater oversight over how arrests are used and disseminated 
outside the criminal justice system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Arrests are more than the point of entry into the criminal justice system. 
They also drive a host of other decisions. A number of actors outside the crimi-
nal justice system, such as immigration enforcement officials, public housing 
authorities, public benefits administrators, employers, licensing authorities, so-
cial services providers, and education officials, among others, routinely receive 
and review arrest information. These actors use arrest information for their own 
purposes and in ways that are distinct from the aims of the criminal justice sys-
tem. Arrests now serve as a significant source of regulation, separate and apart 
from their role in the criminal justice system. 
Immigration enforcement officials use arrests as a screening tool—as a 
way of winnowing down a population of eleven million unauthorized immi-
grants and selecting approximately 400,000 for deportation in any given year.1 
Landlords and public housing authorities use arrest information to initiate 
breach of contract claims. Public employers and licensing authorities use ar-
 
 1. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FY 
2013 ICE IMMIGRATION REMOVALS (2013), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about 
/offices/ero/pdf/2013-ice-immigration-removals.pdf (citing 368,644 removals in fiscal year 
2013); Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, to 
All ICE Employees, Civil Immigration Enforcement: Priorities for Apprehension, Detention, 
and Removal of Aliens (Mar. 2, 2011) [hereinafter Morton Memorandum on Civil Immigra-
tion Enforcement], available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorial-discretion/civil 
-imm-enforcement-priorities_app-detn-reml-aliens.pdf. 
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rests to monitor off-duty workers, such as home health care workers, taxi driv-
ers, public school employees, and private security guards. And in the foster 
care, social services, and education contexts, arrests are used to monitor poten-
tial risks to children. In each of these contexts, it is the fact of an arrest itself—
not only a subsequent conviction—that triggers a regulatory decision, such as 
deportation, eviction, loss of a professional license, or loss of custody.  
With the national rollout of an ambitious information-sharing program now 
known as the Priority Enforcement Program, immigration officials use arrests 
to check the immigration status of every person arrested anywhere in the coun-
try.2 Immigration enforcement officials use arrests to identify and deport cer-
tain noncitizens who come into contact with the criminal justice system, while 
strategically ignoring those who do not.3 For immigration enforcement offi-
cials, arrests function as a way of determining whether the arrested individual 
falls within an immigration removal priority. Criminal law determinations of 
guilt or innocence are distinct from the immigration screening process.4 
In the public housing context,5 authorities use arrests to evaluate breach of 
contract claims and to monitor entry into households.6 Leases for publicly 
owned or subsidized housing prohibit criminal activity by any tenant, house-
hold member, or guest.7 Arrests are used as a proxy for determining whether a 
tenant breached her lease and to predict whether a household is likely to cause 
future disruptions or damage to the property. Public housing authorities use ar-
rests to initiate eviction proceedings and as negotiating tools. They may use the 
threat of eviction to leverage an agreement that the household will bar the ar-
rested individual from entry—sometimes permanently. The housing decision 
 
 2. The program was initially launched as “Secure Communities.” Secure Communi-
ties, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2015). On November 20, 2014, Secure Communities was discontinued and 
replaced with the Priority Enforcement Program. See Memorandum from Jeh Charles John-
son, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Thomas S. Winkowski et al., Secure Communi-
ties (Nov. 20, 2014) [hereinafter Johnson Memorandum on Secure Communities], available 
at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_secure_communities 
.pdf (discussing the need for a “fresh start and a new program,” while maintaining the goal 
of Secure Communities to “effectively identify and facilitate the removal of criminal al-
iens”).   
 3. I use the terms “deportation” and “removal” interchangeably, although immigra-
tion laws now typically use the term “removal.” See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2013). In addi-
tion, this Article uses the term “arrest” to refer solely to criminal arrests and not to civil ar-
rests, such as civil immigration arrests. 
 4. Immigration enforcement officials decide whether to flag an arrested individual as 
a removal priority at the time of booking. The immigration enforcement decision is made 
prior to the adjudication of the criminal charges and may be unaffected by whether or not the 
arrested individual is convicted. But criminal and immigration goals also overlap in certain 
ways. For instance, undocumented noncitizens with prior criminal convictions are consid-
ered immigration removal priorities. See infra Part II.A.  
 5. Throughout this Article, I use “public housing” to refer to publicly owned or pub-
licly operated housing. 
 6. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 7. See 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(l)(5)(iii)(A) (2014); id. § 982.553(b). 
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may take place prior to a criminal trial and may affect innocent tenants; evic-
tions affect the entire household, not only those who come into contact with the 
criminal justice system.8 
Other examples abound. In the public employment and licensing context, 
arrests are used to monitor off-duty workers. Many public employers and li-
censing agencies automatically receive notifications when certain workers are 
arrested and booked by local law enforcement agencies.9 Upon receiving the 
notification, some employers launch their own investigation, while others reas-
sign or suspend an arrested worker. Employers focus on their own institutional 
motivations when taking adverse employment actions, including their potential 
liability for torts such as negligent hiring and retention.10 They may automati-
cally suspend or terminate workers after learning of the arrest, making a calcu-
lated judgment that it is easier to replace a worker than it is to investigate 
whether she poses a security risk. 
In the social services context, child protective services may be notified 
when a child’s caretaker is arrested.11 The purpose is to provide resources for 
children who may be at risk, but the notification can trigger unintended conse-
quences. It may embroil caretakers who are innocent or arrested on only petty 
charges with unnecessary and long-term involvement with social services. In 
the foster care context, licensing agencies use arrests to monitor foster families 
and to determine whether a household member poses a risk to a foster child. In 
the context of schools and universities, arrests are used to monitor whether a 
student poses a risk to others, to impose discipline, and, in some cases, to eval-
uate whether to offer counseling or other services to the arrested individual.12 
In each of these contexts, arrests are used as screening tools or as a rela-
tively low-cost audit mechanism. Arrests provide a way to monitor individuals, 
to evaluate whether the arrested individual falls into a regulatory priority, and 
ultimately to determine whether to modify a preexisting social or legal ar-
rangement.  
In spite of the extensive effects that arrests have outside the criminal justice 
context, they remain surprisingly understudied. Even as advocates, criminal law 
scholars, and courts have drawn greater attention to the civil consequences of 
criminal convictions,13 they have paid relatively little attention to the effects of 
 
 8. See, e.g., Matthew Desmond et al., Evicting Children, 92 SOC. FORCES 303, 304 
(2013) (finding that families with children were significantly more likely to be evicted than 
similarly situated families without children). 
 9. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 10. NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, COLLATERAL DAMAGE: AMERICA’S 
FAILURE TO FORGIVE OR FORGET IN THE WAR ON CRIME 36-37 (2014), available at http:// 
www.nacdl.org/restoration/roadmapreport (discussing the role of negligent hiring torts in 
background checks). 
 11. See infra Part II.C.2.  
 12. See infra Part II.C.4. 
 13. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era 
of Mass Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 1790, 1800-01 (2012); Michael Pinard, Col-
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arrests—particularly subfelony arrests, such as misdemeanors. Scholars have 
provided compelling accounts of how aggressive order-maintenance policing 
and broken misdemeanor courts take a toll on the poor and on communities of 
color,14 and chronicled how criminal punishment and the threat of punishment 
has become a pervasive mechanism of social control.15 But these accounts—
troubling as they are—understate the full consequences of arrests outside of the 
criminal justice system.16  
On the noncriminal justice side, immigration scholars in particular have 
given sustained attention in recent years to how criminal law actors affect civil 
immigration enforcement. They have argued that partnerships between criminal 
justice actors and civil immigration enforcement officials cede significant en-
forcement authority to state and local police17 and create an enforcement sys-
 
lateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 457 (2010); Michael Pinard & Anthony C. Thompson, Offender Reentry and 
the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: An Introduction, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 585 (2006); McGregor Smyth, From “Collateral” to “Integral”: The Seismic 
Evolution of Padilla v. Kentucky and Its Impact on Penalties Beyond Deportation, 54 HOW. 
L.J. 795, 825 (2011); McGregor Smyth, Holistic Is Not a Bad Word: A Criminal Defense 
Attorney’s Guide to Using Invisible Punishments as an Advocacy Strategy, 36 U. TOL. L. 
REV. 479, 494-96 (2005); see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365-66 (2010) (dis-
cussing the collateral immigration consequences of convictions); NAT’L INVENTORY COL-
LATERAL CONSEQUENCES CONVICTION, http://www.abacollateralconsequences.org (last visit-
ed Mar. 30, 2015) (compiling the results of a congressionally mandated study of collateral 
consequences of criminal convictions in all U.S. jurisdictions).  
 14. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN 
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISH-
MENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (1979); Albert W. Alschuler, Imple-
menting the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining Sys-
tem, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 952-53 (1983) (discussing the “process costs” of misdemeanor 
court as being so severe that “[a] misdemeanor defendant, even if innocent, usually is well 
advised to waive every available procedural protection (including the right to counsel) and to 
plead guilty at the earliest possible opportunity”); K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives from Bro-
ken Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive Order-Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271, 297-99 (2009); Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: 
Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 297-
300 (2011) (discussing the significant collateral consequences of minor misdemeanor con-
victions). For a recent analysis of misdemeanor arrests in New York City, see Issa Kohler-
Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611 (2014).  
 15. ALEXANDER, supra note 14; DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME 
AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2001).  
 16. There are recent exceptions that provide a sustained treatment of the effects of 
subfelony arrests in their own right. See, e.g., Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 14; Issa Kohler- 
Hausmann, Misdemeanor Justice: Control Without Conviction, 119 AM. J. SOC. 351, 351 
(2013) (noting that the literature focusing on prison and the consequences of felony convic-
tions fails to account for the full reach of arrests); Alexandra Natapoff, Aggregation and Ur-
ban Misdemeanors, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1043 (2013) [hereinafter Natapoff, Aggregation 
and Urban Misdemeanors] (focusing on the processing of urban misdemeanors); Alexandra 
Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313 (2012) [hereinafter Natapoff, Misde-
meanors] (analyzing misdemeanor arrests and convictions); Roberts, supra note 14.  
 17. See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion That Matters: Federal Immigration 
Enforcement, State and Local Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819, 
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tem in which noncitizens receive a different type of justice than citizens.18 T-
hese scholars typically depict the relationship between police and prosecutors, 
on the one hand, and civil immigration enforcement authorities, on the other, as 
collaborative. Indeed, immigration scholars and practitioners not infrequently 
describe themselves as working in the merged field of “crimmigration”19—
with the label suggesting that “[i]mmigration enforcement and criminal justice 
 
1858 (2011); Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws in the Inherent Authority Position: Why In-
viting Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 965, 977-78 (2004); Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immi-
gration Laws, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084, 1090-93 (2004). 
 18. See, e.g., Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Varia-
tion in Local Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126, 1147-56 (2013); David Alan Sklansky, 
Crime, Immigration, and Ad Hoc Instrumentalism, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 157, 202 (2012); 
see also Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, 
Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 553-58 (2001) (discussing policy 
objections to various state-based measures to regulate immigration, including the potential 
for discrimination).  
 19. The literature is too voluminous to fully cite here. Recent contributions that dis-
cuss the merger of criminal and immigration enforcement norms include Jennifer M. 
Chacón, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the Adjudication of Fourth and 
Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1574-75 (2010) (discussing the “dramatic rise 
in the prosecution of migration-related criminal offenses within the criminal justice system, 
increasing reliance on removal as a collateral (or alternative) form of punishing crime or 
suspected criminality, and the use of quasi-criminal institutions—such as immigration deten-
tion and investigatory raids . . . in what are nominally purely civil immigration investigations 
and proceedings”), Gabriel J. Chin, Illegal Entry as Crime, Deportation as Punishment: Im-
migration Status and the Criminal Process, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1417, 1420 (2011) (arguing 
that “deportation and other aspects of immigration status are often key considerations in the 
disposition of a criminal case”), Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1281, 1288 (2010) (analyzing how federal prosecutors and immigration actors coordi-
nate), Daniel Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented: Ironic Boundaries of the Post-
September 11th “Pale of Law,” 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 639, 652 (2004) (“Deporta-
tion is now often a virtually automatic consequence of a non-citizen’s criminal conviction 
for even a minor state misdemeanor.”), Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration 
Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 
482 (2007) (“Just as more and more immigration violations are culminating in criminal con-
victions, so too are more and more criminal convictions culminating in deportation or other 
adverse immigration consequences.”), Allegra M. McLeod, The U.S. Criminal-Immigration 
Convergence and Its Possible Undoing, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 105 (2012), Teresa A. Miller, 
Citizenship and Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms and the New Penology, 17 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 618 (2003) (arguing that the “‘criminalization’ of immigration law fails to 
capture the dynamic process by which both systems converge at points to create a new sys-
tem of social control that draws from both immigration and criminal justice, but it is purely 
neither”), Sklansky, supra note 18, at 202, Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immi-
grants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367 (2006) (discussing the “crimi-
nalization” of immigration law), and Juliet P. Stumpf, Doing Time: Crimmigration Law and 
the Perils of Haste, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1705, 1710 (2011) (“Crimmigration law narrows the 
decision whether to shut the noncitizen out of the national community to a single moment in 
time: the moment of the crime that triggers the potential for deportation or incarceration for 
an immigration-related offense.”).  
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are now so thoroughly entangled it is impossible to say where one starts and the 
other leaves off.”20  
This Article seeks to supplement this account and to place a number of ac-
tors that rely on arrests in relation to each other. I want to suggest that one way 
of understanding arrests is as a regulatory tool—a means of monitoring, order-
ing, and tracking individuals. The aim of this type of regulation can be quite 
distinct from certain criminal law concerns—adjudicating guilt or innocence, 
maintaining law and order, deterring crime, and meting out punishment.  
Noncriminal justice actors rely on arrests not necessarily because they are 
the best screening tools from the perspective of institutional design. Rather, 
they value arrests because they are relatively easy and inexpensive to access 
and because they regard arrests as proxies for information they value, such as 
the potential for violence, unreliability, or instability. Using arrests in this man-
ner can be a rational administrative decision. If done with appropriate restraints 
and oversight, it can serve important safety objectives.  
But using arrests to monitor, control, and ultimately reach regulatory deci-
sions also has the potential to carry serious costs—ones that the actors who rely 
on arrests are poorly situated to understand. Reliance on arrests alone magnifies 
the significance of a police officer’s decision to arrest and has important feed-
back effects on the criminal justice system. Noncriminal justice actors who rely 
on arrests may act in coordination with police and prosecutors, or they may act 
autonomously. Coordination has the potential to expand the reach of criminal 
justice actors. For criminal prosecutors, civil enforcement can serve to supple-
ment, or even supplant, criminal law enforcement. For instance, criminal prose-
cutors who are unable to proceed with unlawfully obtained evidence in criminal 
court can present that evidence in civil proceedings, which have more lax evi-
dentiary standards.21 Deportation, eviction, or other civil consequences can 
thus serve to supplement or to replace criminal consequences. 
But at other times, criminal and noncriminal law actors operate autono-
mously and at cross-purposes. For instance, immigration officials may deport a 
cooperating witness in a criminal case.22 Public housing officials may evict a 
domestic violence victim along with her abuser.23 Employers may suspend or 
fire an arrested worker, even when prosecutors or judges determine that a rogue 
police officer made a false arrest.24 These types of enforcement choices can 
undermine the integrity of the criminal justice system and discourage commu-
 
 20. Sklansky, supra note 18, at 159. 
 21. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1034 (1984); infra Part III.A.  
 22. See Orde F. Kittrie, Federalism, Deportation, and Crime Victims Afraid to Call the 
Police, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1449, 1461 (2006) (discussing how the threat of deportation may 
prevent noncitizens from reporting crime). 
 23. See Lenora M. Lapidus, Doubly Victimized: Housing Discrimination Against Vic-
tims of Domestic Violence, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 377, 383 (2003) (discuss-
ing battered women who are deterred from calling the police for fear of eviction); see also 
discussion infra Part III.B.1. 
 24. See infra Part III.B.2. 
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nity members from reporting crime or cooperating with law enforcement offic-
ers.  
Conflict between the way that arrests are used by criminal justice actors—
primarily police and prosecutors—and by actors outside of the criminal justice 
system can arise in a number of ways. Noncriminal justice actors may focus 
narrowly on their own enforcement priorities and disregard other concerns. 
Noncriminal justice actors also have imperfect knowledge about how arrests 
are handled by the criminal justice system. Even when administrative actors 
and other authorities make good-faith efforts to avoid enforcement against 
those who have been subjected to false arrests or who are cooperating with po-
lice, they all too often lack timely access to the information necessary to exer-
cise discretion. The consequences can be particularly severe for those who are 
disproportionately likely to be arrested for minor crimes and those who are un-
able to mitigate the effects of an arrest on their own.  
In the criminal justice context, criminal procedure provides important con-
straints on how arrests ought to be used and processed.25 But similar con-
straints do not operate outside of the criminal justice context, leaving the possi-
bility that manifestly unfair, unlawful, or otherwise undesirable arrests may 
have serious consequences. This Article describes different ways that arrests 
are used for noncriminal justice ends, maps the regulatory interactions between 
various actors who rely on arrests, and ultimately argues that there is a need for 
greater transparency and oversight over how arrest information is used.  
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I briefly discusses how arrests are 
used and regulated in the criminal justice system and lays the foundation for 
comparing how other actors use arrests. Part II demonstrates how arrests func-
tion as the starting point for a host of decisions outside the realm of criminal 
law. It focuses primarily on immigration enforcement and public housing, and 
it also examines how arrests trigger decisions in the contexts of public em-
ployment, licensing, foster care, social services, and juvenile education. Part III 
examines how criminal justice actors and others interact in their use of arrests. 
They may cooperate, both working together to achieve shared regulatory ends, 
or they may conflict, such as when noncriminal justice actors attach causal con-
sequences to arrests that create undesirable public policy outcomes from the 
criminal justice perspective. Part IV evaluates civil administrative discretion as 
a regulatory strategy, and it preliminarily explores alternatives, including re-
 
 25. In theory, an arrest is not meant to be a form of punishment. See, e.g., Schware v. 
Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 353 U.S. 232, 241 (1957) (“The mere fact that a man has been arrested 
has very little, if any, probative value in showing that he has engaged in any misconduct. An 
arrest shows nothing more than that someone probably suspected the person apprehended of 
an offense.” (footnote omitted)); Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 482 (1948) (“Ar-
rest without more does not, in law any more than in reason, impeach the integrity or impair 
the credibility of a witness. It happens to the innocent as well as the guilty. . . . Arrest with-
out more may nevertheless impair or cloud one’s reputation. False arrest may do that.”). In 
practice, the constraints of criminal procedure all too often fall short—see discussion infra 
Part I—but they nonetheless present an important way of regulating the effects of arrests.  
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stricting the sharing of arrest information and exercising greater oversight over 
how arrest information is used.   
I. CRIMINAL LAW USE OF ARRESTS 
In order to understand how reliance on arrests shapes civil law decisions, 
we must first understand how arrests operate in criminal law. The criminal jus-
tice process grants broad discretion to individual police officers to make arrests, 
but criminal procedure interposes an important, though imperfect, set of con-
straints between the fact of the arrest and its subsequent use.  
This Part discusses how arrest patterns unfold, the motivations behind mis-
demeanor arrests, and the effects of high arrest rates on the poor and on com-
munities of color. It also briefly describes how arrests are processed in criminal 
proceedings. The following Part then discusses how arrests are used in a variety 
of noncriminal contexts.  
A. Arrests in the Criminal Justice System 
The United States is the global leader in incarceration,26 due in part to its 
staggering arrest rate. Today, one out of every three adults can expect to be ar-
rested by the age of twenty-three.27 For Latino and African American men, the 
statistics are even more stark. Approximately forty-nine percent of black men 
and forty-four percent of Latino men will be arrested by the age of twenty-
three.28 Sixty-five million adults in the United States today have a criminal 
record.29  
The reasons for these high arrest rates are complex. Potential explanations 
include relatively high crime rates,30 overly broad criminal laws,31 relatively 
 
 26. See LAUREN E. GLAZE & ERINN J. HERBERMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CORREC-
TIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2012, at 1 (2013) (reporting that, in 2012, ap-
proximately one out of every thirty-five adults in the United States, or approximately three 
percent of the adult population, was under some form of correctional supervision—
probation, parole, or incarceration); Adam Liptak, Inmate Count in U.S. Dwarfs Other Na-
tions’, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/23/us/23prison.html.  
 27. Robert Brame et al., Cumulative Prevalence of Arrest from Ages 8 to 23 in a Na-
tional Sample, 129 PEDIATRICS 21, 25 (2012). 
 28. Robert Brame et al., Demographic Patterns of Cumulative Arrest Prevalence by 
Ages 18 and 23, 60 CRIME & DELINQ. 471, 478 (2014).  
 29. Michael Pinard, Criminal Records, Race and Redemption, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & 
PUB. POL’Y 963, 964 (2013). Criminal history records are defined as “identifiable descrip-
tions and notations of arrests, detentions, indictments, or other formal criminal charges, and 
any disposition arising therefrom, including acquittal, sentencing, correctional supervision, 
or release.” 42 U.S.C. § 14616(I)(4)(A) (2013). 
 30. See Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Legislating Racial Fairness in Criminal Justice, 39 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 233, 256 & n.102 (2007) (discussing the relatively higher crime 
rate in the United States as compared to other industrialized nations).  
 31. See, e.g., Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 
703, 714-18 (2005) (describing overcriminalization as partially the product of superfluous 
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aggressive prosecution of low-level crimes,32 reliance on elected prosecutors 
and judges who are pressured to be tough on crime,33 and a disproportionate 
media focus on issues relating to crime.34 For our purposes, the most relevant 
fact is that arrest rates are relatively high, making arrests a valuable source of 
data.  
The criminal justice system delegates broad discretion to individual police 
officers to make arrests. To make a lawful arrest, a police officer need only sat-
isfy the relatively low threshold of probable cause.35 Probable cause provides a 
minimum floor for when a police officer may make an arrest, but it does not 
provide insight into the further question of whether the arrest ought to be 
made—whether the arrest is necessary to deter crime, maintain the rule of law, 
or protect communities.36 
While arrest patterns vary across localities, reflecting local law enforce-
ment priorities, available data indicate that subfelony arrests—misdemeanors, 
infractions, and violations—vastly outnumber felony arrests.37 Misdemean-
ors—minor offenses, such as suspended license charges, disorderly conduct, 
drug possession, and minor assault, which are generally defined as punishable 
 
criminal statutes); Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, Can a Model Penal Code Second 
Save the States from Themselves?, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 169, 170-73 (2003) (describing and 
critiquing the expansion of criminal codes); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of 
Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 515 (2001) (“[A]nyone who studies contemporary 
state or federal criminal codes is likely to be struck by their scope, by the sheer amount of 
conduct they render punishable.”).  
 32. See, e.g., BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF 
BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 166-80 (2001) (critiquing public order policing). 
 33. See, e.g., Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 519 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(noting that elected judges face pressure to “constantly profess their fealty” to the high-
profile issue of capital punishment); Joanna Cohn Weiss, Note, Tough on Crime: How Cam-
paigns for State Judiciary Violate Criminal Defendants’ Due Process Rights, 81 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1101, 1103-12 (2006) (collecting examples of how judicial candidates vie to express 
tough-on-crime rhetoric). 
 34. See Pinard, supra note 13, at 472-73 (summarizing various arguments relating to 
the unique focus on crime in the United States). 
 35. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001). 
 36. Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 776-81, 792 
(2012) (arguing that constitutional law as a whole does not ensure that arrests are effective in 
reducing crime, and advocating for “harm-efficient policing”). 
 37. R. LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF 
STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2010 STATE COURT CASELOADS 24 (2012), available at 
http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/DATA%20PDF/CSP_DEC 
.ashx (showing that misdemeanors significantly outnumber felonies in the criminal caseloads 
of seventeen selected states); R. LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAM-
INING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF 2008 STATE COURT CASELOADS 47 
(2010) [hereinafter LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., 2008 REPORT], available at http://www 
.courtstatistics.org/Other-Pages/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/EWSC-2008-Online.ashx (cit-
ing 2008 data from eleven states and describing misdemeanor cases as comprising an “over-
whelming majority of criminal caseloads”); see also Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 16, at 
352 n.3 (noting the difficulty of obtaining reliable data on state misdemeanor filings and cit-
ing data obtained from the National Center for State Courts to show 5.9 million misdemean-
or filings compared to 1.39 million felony filings in 2009 in sixteen jurisdictions).  
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by no more than one year in jail, and often punished with little or no jail 
time38—constitute a majority of state court caseloads.39 Alexandra Natapoff 
writes that in some localities, up to forty percent of the docket may consist of 
suspended license cases, while other common misdemeanors include disorderly 
conduct, driving under the influence of alcohol, drug possession, and minor as-
sault.40 In New York City alone, 35,000 people were arrested in 2012 for crim-
inal possession of marijuana in the fifth degree, a crime that in essence involves 
possession of marijuana in public view.41  
Law enforcement officers have powerful incentives to focus on minor ar-
rests. Minor arrests provide opportunities to interrogate suspects, check for pri-
or criminal records and outstanding warrants, and search for evidence of more 
serious crime.42 Petty arrests also give law enforcement an opportunity to mon-
itor arrested individuals over time, particularly when arrests remain open for 
months or even years due to delayed court dates, or when arrested individuals 
agree to a form of court-ordered monitoring as a condition of dismissal.43 Ar-
rests can also give police officers the opportunity to respond to incentives that 
have little to do with crime control—such as seizing property through civil for-
feiture laws or responding to arrest quotas.44 
 
 38. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(4) (McKinney 2014).  
 39. LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., 2008 REPORT, supra note 37, at 47 (showing the proportion of 
felony to misdemeanor arrests in selected states); see also ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., 
NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE 
TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS 7 (2009) (describing an “explosive 
growth” in misdemeanor cases), available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/defenseupdates 
/misdemeanor/$FILE/Report.pdf; Natapoff, Misdemeanors, supra note 16, at 1321 (noting 
that in 2009, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) estimated there were approximately 
758,000 arrests for marijuana possession, 655,000 disorderly conduct arrests, and over 
112,000 curfew and loitering arrests).  
 40. Natapoff, Misdemeanors, supra note 16, at 1321. 
 41. N.Y.C. CRIMINAL COURT, CRIMINAL COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK: ANNUAL 
REPORT 2012, at 31 (2013). This was the single most frequent arraignment charge in 2012. 
Id. at 32. 
 42. See Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision 
Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1694-96 (2010); Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 
14, at 636 (“Records—checking old ones, making new ones, and transmitting and sharing 
existing ones—were key to these endeavors because they helped the police sort people ac-
cording to law enforcement encounters over time.”).  
 43. One common form of court-ordered monitoring in New York City courts is an “ad-
journment in contemplation of dismissal,” or ACD, where an arrested individual agrees to 
keep the arrest open for a period of no more than six months (or, for family offenses, no 
more than one year); if there are no new arrests in the interim period, the case is dismissed. 
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.55 (McKinney 2014). For a detailed discussion of how law 
enforcement uses open arrests to monitor arrested individuals, see Kohler-Hausmann, supra 
note 14.  
 44. Bowers, supra note 42, at 1695 & nn.183-87; Joseph Goldstein, Stop-and-Frisk 
Trial Turns to Claim of Arrest Quotas, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2013), http://www.nytimes 
.com/2013/03/21/nyregion/stop-and-frisk-trial-focuses-on-claim-of-arrest-quotas.html (de-
scribing evidence that police officers were told to meet quotas).  
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B. The Consequences of Arrests 
All of these arrests come with a cost. For the arrested individual, the pro-
cess of being taken into police custody, handcuffed, fingerprinted, and held in 
jail—particularly for relatively minor and common behavior—can cause signif-
icant distress.45 This is particularly true when the arrest itself is unlawful46 or 
perceived as unfair or unjustified.47 Arrests can also harm communities, partic-
ularly when police use public order policing strategies to disproportionately 
target low-income communities of color.48 While the proponents of such strat-
egies assert that they make communities safer, their critics argue that they im-
pose unjustified harm, particularly on racial minorities and the poor.49 
Recent litigation over New York City’s stop-and-frisk policy highlights the 
racial impact that order-maintenance policing can have. After a bench trial, 
Judge Scheindlin of the Southern District of New York determined that New 
York City police officers made 4.4 million stops in an eight-year period from 
2004 to 2012, and that over eighty percent of those stopped were racial minori-
ties.50 While the vast majority of those subject to Terry stops were not arrested, 
blacks were thirty percent more likely to be arrested for the same alleged crime 
than similarly situated whites.51 
Criminal procedure is intended to place important safeguards between a 
police officer’s decision to make an arrest and its subsequent consequences. 
Defendants in criminal cases have the right to constitutionally adequate coun-
sel,52 the right to suppress evidence that was illegally obtained,53 and the right 
to cross-examine witnesses, including testifying police officers.54 Prosecutors 
evaluate arrests and independently determine what charges should be brought, 
 
 45. Harmon, supra note 36, at 778-79. 
 46. While emotional harm is inherently difficult to quantify, awards in misdemeanor 
false arrest cases provide some indication of how significant juries can find the process of 
being arrested. See, e.g., Martinez v. Port Auth., 445 F.3d 158, 160-61 (2d Cir. 2006) (per 
curiam) (describing a $360,000 award for a false misdemeanor arrest as within the range of 
similar cases); Martinez v. Port Auth., No. 01 Civ. 721(PKC), 2005 WL 2143333, at *3, 
*17-19 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2005) (noting that the false misdemeanor arrest involved a total of 
eighteen hours of incarceration and describing plaintiff’s testimony about his emotional 
harm), aff’d per curiam, 445 F.3d 158. 
 47. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 346-47 (2001) (describing “gra-
tuitous humiliations imposed by a police officer who was (at best) exercising extremely poor 
judgment”).  
 48. See generally Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarcera-
tion in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271 (2004) (discussing how mass 
imprisonment harms African American communities).  
 49. Bowers, supra note 42, at 1693, 1699.  
 50. Floyd v. City of N.Y., 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 51. Id. at 558-60. For Terry stops, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 52. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963). 
 53. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). But see Davis v. United States, 131 S. 
Ct. 2419, 2426 (2011). 
 54. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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if any.55 A judge must also review the facts of the arrest and determine that 
probable cause exists.56 These constraints are meant to ensure that the arrested 
individual has adequate advice about the nature and seriousness of the charges 
against him, the opportunity to present a fair defense, and access to a speedy 
trial.  
The constraints of criminal procedure, while important, all too often fail to 
fulfill their intent. A defendant’s treatment in criminal court depends on a va-
riety of factors, such as whether the defendant appears in state or federal court, 
the seriousness of the arrest, the defendant’s personal background and criminal 
history, the defendant’s resources, and the resources of the defense bar.57 Pros-
ecutors have professional incentives to exercise inadequate discretion and to 
overcharge.58 Criminal procedure also does little to address deeper underlying 
problems in policing, such as arrest practices that disparately target minori-
ties.59 
Given these dynamics, it is often easier in practice for an arrested individu-
al, particularly one charged with a minor crime, to accept a relatively lenient 
plea bargain rather than to contest charges and proceed to trial.60 Any arrest, 
including for a minor offense, can lead to a chain of civil consequences, such as 
 
 55. See Máximo Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining: The Practice and Reform of 
Prosecutorial Adjudication in American Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 223, 225 
(2006) (arguing that “prosecutors have become some of the main de facto adjudicators of 
U.S. criminal procedure”); Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 
66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 2125 (1998) (describing how prosecutors exercise discretion, 
including as a result of discussions with defense counsel). 
 56. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113-14 (1975). 
 57. See, e.g., BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., supra note 39, at 9 (“In Chicago, Atlanta and Mi-
ami, defenders carry more than 2,000 misdemeanor cases per year. With these massive case-
loads, defenders have to resolve approximately 10 cases a day—or one case every hour—not 
nearly enough time to mount a constitutionally adequate defense.” (footnote omitted)); John 
C. Jeffries, Jr. & John Gleeson, The Federalization of Organized Crime: Advantages of Fed-
eral Prosecution, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1095, 1101, 1125 (1995) (discussing the relative ad-
vantages of federal prosecutions over state prosecutions in organized crime cases); Kohler-
Hausmann, supra note 14, at 654 (noting that on a typical day in a New York City arraign-
ment courtroom, the court will process between 100 and 200 cases during the course of six 
hours); Natapoff, Aggregation and Urban Misdemeanors, supra note 16, at 1059-60 (arguing 
that defendants typically fail to receive individualized justice in the sense contemplated by 
criminal procedure in misdemeanor court). 
 58. See Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial 
Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 862-63 (1995) 
(discussing prosecutorial incentives); Jenny Roberts, Crashing the Misdemeanor System, 70 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089, 1092 (2013) (“Prosecutors have largely failed to exercise discre-
tion and seek justice in sorting through the huge number of misdemeanor cases that the po-
lice send them, instead churning high volumes through the overburdened lower courts.”). 
 59. See Brandon Garrett, Remedying Racial Profiling, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
41, 48-60 (2001) (describing the difficulty in gaining data about and remedying racial profil-
ing).  
 60. See generally Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117 
(2008) (arguing that it is generally better for a typical innocent defendant in a petty criminal 
case to accept a guilty plea than it is to bear the process costs of going to trial). 
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lost work, missed school, or expenses relating to child care or transportation, as 
well as the intangible psychological costs relating to uncertainty or anxiety 
stemming from the pending trial.61 These process costs—the costs attendant to 
being arrested, but not imposed as punishment by the criminal justice system—
can play a decisive role in leading arrested individuals to take plea agree-
ments.62 A 2013 study of low-income defendants facing misdemeanor charges 
relating to petty marijuana possession in the Bronx, New York, depicts a setting 
in which defendants routinely take plea agreements because it is too costly to 
contest charges at trial.63 According to the report, the typical arrested individu-
al who contested her charges appeared in court an average of five times over 
the course of eight months.64 Most of the time, the proceedings ended with the 
prosecutors requesting an adjournment.65 Due to backlogs in the court system, 
these delays rarely count for speedy trial purposes. If a prosecutor requests a 
weeklong adjournment, knowing that the next available court date is likely 
months away, only the time actually requested counts for speedy trial purpos-
es.66 According to the study, the average time for a dismissal of a minor mari-
juana case was 270 days from the date of arrest.67  
 
 61. PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE 3-19 (2009) (dis-
cussing the emotional impact of the author’s own arrest, prosecution, and ultimate acquittal); 
Alschuler, supra note 14, at 932 (discussing how arrested individuals make tactical decisions 
to accept plea bargains based on the costs of proceeding to trial, rather than on considera-
tions that are properly related to the objective of criminal proceedings); Bowers, supra note 
60, at 1132 (describing defendants’ process costs as generally constituting “pecuniary loss, 
inconvenience, and uncertainty”); Ian Weinstein, The Adjudication of Minor Offenses in New 
York City, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1157, 1172 (2004) (discussing how defendants typically 
return to court “three to six times before there is any real likelihood that a witness will be 
called and a factual record developed”).  
 62. Malcolm Feeley’s classic 1979 study argues that “process costs”—“[t]he time, ef-
fort, money, and opportunities lost as a direct result of being caught up in the [lower court 
criminal justice] system”—“can quickly come to outweigh the penalty that issues from adju-
dication and sentence.” FEELEY, supra note 14, at 30-31. 
 63. BRONX DEFENDERS, NO DAY IN COURT: MARIJUANA POSSESSION CASES AND THE 
FAILURE OF THE BRONX CRIMINAL COURTS 12-15 (2013), available at http://www 
.bronxdefenders.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/No-Day-in-Court-A-Report-by-The-Bronx 
-Defenders-May-2013.pdf. 
 64. Id. at 3. This statistic is based on a study of fifty-four marijuana possession ar-
restees represented by the Bronx Defenders who were arraigned in the one-year period from 
March 2011 to March 2012 and who expressed an interested in contesting the charges 
against them. Id. at 2. 
 65. Id. at 3 (“Prosecutorial delay accounted for over 80% of postponements of hearing 
and trial dates.” (bolding omitted)); see also id. at 8 (noting that Bronx prosecutors answered 
“not ready” for trial seventy-five out of eighty-nine trial dates). 
 66. For a discussion of delays in misdemeanor adjudication in the Bronx, New York, 
see William Glaberson, In Misdemeanor Cases, Long Waits for Elusive Trials, N.Y.  
TIMES (Apr. 30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/01/nyregion/justice-denied-for 
-misdemeanor-cases-trials-are-elusive.html. 
 67. BRONX DEFENDERS, supra note 63, at 10; see also Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 
16, at 377 (describing the case of a misdemeanor defendant compelled to make eight court 
appearances from May 2011 to November 2011—taking a full day off of work for most of 
them—before all charges were dismissed). 
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Each court appearance exacts costs. Arrested individuals may be compelled 
to take unpaid leave from work and incur attorneys’ fees and other expenses. 
They also face the emotional uncertainty of the trial outcome. Some can also 
expect to spend a night or weekend in jail while awaiting arraignment, or they 
may remain in jail for a longer period of time if bail is set and they cannot af-
ford to pay it.68 These consequences raise the stakes for arrested individuals, 
who overwhelmingly make a rational decision to plead guilty or to accept a 
form of court monitoring, in lieu of proceeding with a trial.69 Prosecutors, of 
course, can amplify this dynamic by offering relatively lenient plea bargains in 
minor cases while seeking maximum penalties for those who choose to proceed 
with their right to a jury trial.70  
Arrested individuals also face ongoing consequences from the creation of a 
criminal record. Absent robust sealing laws, police departments and others may 
widely disseminate criminal records, including arrests that did not result in 
conviction.71 As a matter of constitutional law, the Supreme Court has held that 
an arrested individual has no right to privacy in his arrest information.72 In 
Paul v. Davis, the Supreme Court considered whether a photographer’s due 
process rights had been violated after his local police department identified him 
as an “active shoplifter” in a flyer distributed to local businesses.73 Shortly af-
ter the flyer’s distribution, all charges were dismissed.74 But in the interim, his 
 
 68. Mosi Secret, N.Y.C. Misdemeanor Defendants Lack Bail Money, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 
2, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/03/nyregion/03bail.html (citing a 2008 study 
conducted of nonfelony defendants in New York City that showed that in cases where bail 
was set at $1000 or less, close to ninety percent of defendants remained in jail for an average 
of over two weeks because they could not pay); see also Natapoff, Misdemeanors, supra 
note 16, at 1321-23 (discussing the effects of jail time). 
 69. Bowers, supra note 60, at 1132-39 (discussing the process costs involved in seek-
ing to contest a petty criminal charge); Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 14, at 663 (noting that 
misdemeanor defendants in New York City are much more likely to take a plea if they are 
held in custody than if they are not); Weinstein, supra note 61, at 1172 (discussing the ad-
vantages to taking a plea where a prosecutor offers to reduce the charge to a violation). 
 70. Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 
989, 1046 (2006). 
 71. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (holding that publicly accessible sex offend-
er registries are constitutional); Patricia L. Bellia, Designing Surveillance Law, 43 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 293, 297 (2011); James Jacobs & Tamara Crepet, The Expanding Scope, Use, and 
Availability of Criminal Records, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 177, 207-10 (2008) (dis-
cussing how federal law both permits and mandates certain criminal background checks); 
Erin Murphy, Databases, Doctrine & Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 37 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 803, 804 (2010); Erin Murphy, The Politics of Privacy in the Criminal Justice System: 
Information Disclosure, the Fourth Amendment, and Statutory Law Enforcement Exemp-
tions, 111 MICH. L. REV. 485, 489 (2013). 
 72. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) (rejecting the claim that there is a consti-
tutional right to privacy that prohibits a state from publicizing “a record of an official act 
such as an arrest”). 
 73. Id. at 695. 
 74. Id. at 696. 
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employer saw the flyer, required him to explain the arrest, warned him against 
future arrests, and stopped sending him on assignments to local businesses.75  
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found a due pro-
cess violation based on these facts. It held that the flyer “brand[ed]” the photog-
rapher as an active shoplifter, imposing the “disgrace of a criminal conviction” 
without due process of law.76 The Supreme Court reversed. In a holding that 
stressed the need to combat crime by publicizing suspect information, the Court 
held that while the plaintiff might have a state law defamation claim, he had 
been deprived of neither liberty nor property under the Due Process Clause.77  
Every state now either requires or permits criminal histories to be released 
to noncriminal justice agencies, such as those that grant licenses and provide 
social services.78 Commercial vendors also collect, store, and search arrest in-
formation.79 A number of states make arrest information publicly accessible, 
and some allow anyone who pays a fee to access an arrested individual’s crimi-
nal history.80 And the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI’s) fingerprint da-
tabase—which was designed to provide law enforcement officials with the 
criminal histories of arrested individuals—has long been used outside the crim-
inal justice system, such as by employers who conduct background checks.81  
As a result of the broad use of criminal background checks and the wide-
spread dissemination of arrest information, arrests hold significance separate 
and apart from their treatment in criminal court.82 An open arrest may bar an 
individual from qualifying for public housing or from moving in with a relative 
 
 75. Id.; Davis v. Paul, 505 F.2d 1180, 1184 (6th Cir. 1974), rev’d, 424 U.S. 693.  
 76. Davis, 505 F.2d at 1183-84. 
 77. Paul, 424 U.S. at 709. 
 78. James B. Jacobs, Mass Incarceration and the Proliferation of Criminal Records, 3 
U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 387, 395 (2006) (“[T]here are laws in every state mandating or authoriz-
ing the release of individual criminal history records to certain non-criminal justice govern-
ment agencies—agencies charged with granting licenses to individuals and firms in diverse 
businesses, ranging from liquor stores and bars to banks and private security firms as well as 
to agencies that provide programs and services to vulnerable populations including children, 
the elderly, and the handicapped.”); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAL’S REPORT ON CRIMINAL HISTORY BACKGROUND CHECKS 2 (2006) (noting that most pri-
vate employers conduct background searches through private enterprises or through com-
mercial databases that aggregate criminal records). 
 79. Jacobs & Crepet, supra note 71, at 185-86 (noting that “[s]ome companies have 
constructed their own databases by purchasing criminal history records in bulk from courts 
and state record repositories”). 
 80. Jacobs, supra note 78, at 395 (“At least ten (open-records) states treat criminal 
conviction records as public documents; at least three states provide that any member of the 
public may, for a fee, obtain any person’s rap sheet.”); Wayne A. Logan, Liberty Interests in 
the Preventive State: Procedural Due Process and Sex Offender Community Notification 
Laws, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1167, 1172-73 (1999) (noting that by 1996, every state 
had a sex offender registry). 
 81. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 78, at 3-4.  
 82. See, e.g., Chin, supra note 13, at 1790 (arguing that arrest records and convictions 
have led to a new “civil death”). 
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who lives in public housing.83 An arrest may lead to the revocation of proba-
tion or parole.84 Employers regularly require potential employees to disclose 
any prior arrest history, and they may consider all arrests—regardless of 
whether or not they resulted in conviction—when making hiring decisions.85 
Arrests may factor into immigration decisions, such as the determination of 
whether a prospective citizen is of good moral character.86 Because arrest in-
formation is easily accessible when applicants apply for jobs, loans, or public 
benefits, a criminal history has aptly been described as a “negative curriculum 
vitae”—one that serves as a barrier to entry in employment, public benefits, and 
other contexts.87  
Arrests thus impose significant costs outside the criminal justice system. 
But as far-reaching and significant as these costs are, they constitute only a por-
tion of the full reach of arrests. The next Part turns to a discussion of how ar-
rests are used as regulatory tools outside of the criminal justice system, often in 
ways that magnify the effects of policing and arrest decisions.  
 
 83. 42 U.S.C. § 13661 (2013) (granting authority to deny an application for public 
housing based on evidence of criminal activity). 
 84. Tonja Jacobi et al., The Attrition of Rights Under Parole, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 887, 
890 (2014) (describing the low standard for reincarceration following a parole violation and 
noting that “unlike other arrestees, parolees can be held for up to three months awaiting a 
violation hearing”).  
 85. The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission states that the fact of an ar-
rest itself may not be a bar to employment, given that this will have a disparate impact on 
Latinos and African Americans, who are disproportionately arrested. But an employer may 
use the fact of an arrest to launch its own investigation. See U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY 
COMM’N, 915.002, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: CONSIDERATION OF ARREST AND CONVICTION 
RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 
1, 12 (2012). 
 86. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services considers the “[a]bsence or presence of 
other criminal history” as one factor in the good moral character portion of the citizenship 
application. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., USCIS POLICY MANUAL ch. 2 (2014), 
available at http://www.uscis.gov/policymanual/Print/PolicyManual.html. Arrests may also 
be disclosed during the process of seeking to sponsor an immigrant. See Kerry Abrams, Im-
migration Law and the Regulation of Marriage, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1625, 1654-56 (2007) (de-
scribing how certain U.S. citizens who use international matchmaking organizations are le-
gally required to disclose arrests relating to controlled substances or alcohol as a prerequisite 
to contacting a potential fiancé).  
 87. Jacobs & Crepet, supra note 71, at 177 (describing criminal records as a “negative 
curriculum vitae,” “used to determine eligibility for occupational licenses, social welfare 
benefits, employment, and housing”); Jacobs, supra note 78, at 420 (describing arrests as a 
“negative curriculum vitae”); see also BRONX DEFENDERS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEEDINGS IN NEW YORK STATE: A GUIDE FOR CRIMINAL DEFENSE ATTORNEYS AND OTH-
ER ADVOCATES FOR PERSONS WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS 3, 27-30, 58 (2014) (discussing how 
background checks can present barriers in contexts such as employment, licensing, and pub-
lic housing); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 78, at 1-5 (discussing the use of criminal 
background checks for licensing and other positions of trust and describing how such back-
ground checks can create barriers to employment).  
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II. ARRESTS OUTSIDE THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM  
A number of actors outside the criminal justice system use arrest infor-
mation for their own ends. Noncriminal justice actors rely on arrests not be-
cause they are necessarily the best screening tools. Rather, they use arrest in-
formation because it is easily disseminated and stored, and because they regard 
arrests as proxies for certain types of information they value. This Part focuses 
primarily on the role that arrest information plays in immigration enforcement 
and public housing. It then discusses several other contexts in which arrests 
serve as the starting point for regulatory decisions: public employment, licens-
ing, foster care, social services, and education. 
In the contexts described below, arrest information is used as a screening 
or audit mechanism; it is not used as a penal tool. Though the use of arrest in-
formation varies depending on the circumstance, certain similarities emerge 
across contexts: Arrest information is used systemically in a process that often 
begins with reporting by the local precinct. Noncriminal justice actors who rely 
on arrest information may be unconcerned with questions relating to guilt or 
innocence or with whether the police officer had probable cause. The arrested 
individual may be unaware of how her arrest information is being used and 
may have no ability to contest the facts surrounding the arrest. Ultimately, the 
arrest is used as a factor in deciding whether to take some type of enforcement 
action, such as deportation, eviction, or suspension or termination of employ-
ment or of a professional license.  
A. Immigration Enforcement 
For immigration enforcement officials, arrests provide a way of conducting 
immigration screening out of every precinct in the country. In 2013, immigra-
tion enforcement authorities completed the nationwide implementation of an 
ambitious program initially known as Secure Communities,88 and now known 
as the Priority Enforcement Program.89 The program operates principally as an 
information-sharing arrangement among local police, the FBI, and the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security (DHS).90 As a matter of longstanding practice, 
when an arrested individual is booked, his fingerprints are taken and shared 
 
 88. Secure Communities, supra note 2 (noting that Secure Communities was unrolled 
on a limited basis starting in 2008 and full implementation was completed on January 22, 
2013). 
 89. Johnson Memorandum on Secure Communities, supra note 2.  
 90. See Secure Communities, supra note 2 (“[Secure Communities] uses an already-
existing federal information-sharing partnership between ICE and the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation (FBI) that helps to identify criminal aliens without imposing new or additional 
requirements on state and local law enforcement.”); see also Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. 
Miles, Policing Immigration, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 87, 91-99 (2013) (describing the Secure 
Communities rollout and the fingerprinting process in detail); David J. Venturella, Secure 
Communities: Identifying and Removing Criminal Aliens, POLICE CHIEF, Sept. 2010, at 40, 
43. 
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with the FBI. The FBI then checks the fingerprints against its own database and 
alerts the local law enforcement agency about any prior criminal history.91 The 
Priority Enforcement Program takes this process one step further. It automati-
cally reroutes the fingerprint information from the FBI to DHS, and DHS offi-
cials then compare the arrest information against their own immigration-related 
fingerprint database.92  
Immigration screening takes place “behind the scenes” of the criminal ar-
rest; the arresting police officer may or may not be aware that the arrest can 
trigger immigration consequences.93 In using arrest information, immigration 
enforcement officials do not seek to punish the arrested individual or to investi-
gate whether a crime occurred. To the extent U.S. Immigration & Customs En-
forcement (ICE) reviews arrest charges, it uses the arrest information as a 
proxy for its own removal priorities. 
To understand how arrests operate as an immigration-screening device, it is 
important to understand that the United States has long had a de facto practice 
of tolerating the presence of unauthorized immigrants.94 ICE formalized this 
practice in a series of enforcement memoranda that emphasize ICE’s capacity 
to remove only about four percent of the unauthorized population in any given 
year.95 The repackaging of “Secure Communities” as the “Priority Enforce-
 
 91. Throughout this Part, I refer to custodial arrests generally as “arrests.” Individuals 
who are subject to noncustodial arrests—in which they are ticketed but not fingerprinted—
will not be affected, since it is the fingerprinting that triggers the information-sharing pro-
cess. See Secure Communities, supra note 2. 
 92. Id. 
 93. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Secure Communities Talking Points (Jan. 12, 2010), 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities/talkingpointsjanuary122010.pdf. 
 94. David A. Martin, Eight Myths About Immigration Enforcement, 10 N.Y.U. J. 
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 525, 544 (2007) (describing interior immigration enforcement as cost-
ly, inefficient, and “unglamorous and unpopular work in the eyes of most of Homeland Se-
curity’s enforcement personnel”); Motomura, supra note 17, at 1831 (“A massive and sus-
tained commitment of resources would be necessary—though probably not sufficient—to 
apprehend the . . . 11.2 million unauthorized migrants who could be apprehended and placed 
in civil removal proceedings.”). 
 95. Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 
to All Field Office Dirs. et al., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil 
Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and 
Removal of Aliens 2 (June 17, 2011) [hereinafter Morton Memorandum on Exercising Pros-
ecutorial Discretion] (“ICE must prioritize the use of its enforcement personnel, detention 
space, and removal assets to ensure that the aliens it removes represent, as much as possible, 
the agency’s enforcement priorities . . . .”); Morton Memorandum on Civil Immigration En-
forcement, supra note 1, at 1 (framing ICE’s prosecutorial discretion as a matter of allocat-
ing limited resources, stressing that ICE “only has resources to remove approximately 
400,000 aliens per year, less than 4 percent of the estimated illegal alien population in the 
United States”); FY 2013 ICE Immigration Removals, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCE-
MENT, http://www.ice.gov/removal-statistics (last visited Mar. 30, 2015); see also David A. 
Martin, A Defense of Immigration-Enforcement Discretion: The Legal and Policy Flaws in 
Kris Kobach’s Latest Crusade, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 167, 185 & n.59 (2012), http://www 
.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/1119_t3ev663w.pdf (describing “ongoing policy changes meant to 
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ment Program” further reflects the view that some unauthorized noncitizens—
while legally removable—are not administrative removal priorities.96 While 
ICE emphasizes that a number of factors are relevant in determining whether 
any given unauthorized noncitizen falls within a removal priority, until No-
vember 2014, ICE agents under the Obama Administration were generally in-
structed to focus on the following: (1) those with a prior criminal conviction; 
(2) recent unlawful entrants; and (3) those who had previously been ordered 
deported.97 In November 2014, ICE issued new enforcement guidance, but ad-
hered largely to its prior stated goal of focusing on those with prior criminal 
records, recent unlawful entrants, and those who have overstayed removal or-
ders. The most recent guidelines contain a number of priorities, but generally 
instruct immigration officials to focus on the following, in order of importance: 
(1) those who pose a risk to national security, those apprehended while attempt-
ing to unlawfully enter, and those convicted of certain felonies or gang-related 
offenses; (2) those convicted of certain misdemeanors and recent unauthorized 
entrants; and (3) other immigration violators.98  
In keeping with these priorities, immigration enforcement officials who re-
view arrests check both whether the arrested individual appears to be legally 
removable and whether she appears to be an immigration enforcement priority. 
ICE officials consider factors such as the seriousness of the arrest charges, the 
noncitizen’s prior criminal background, and how recently she arrived in the 
United States. Under the Priority Enforcement Program, if ICE determines that 
the arrested individual falls within a removal priority, immigration officials are 
instructed to send a notification request to the jail, asking that the jail notify 
ICE before the arrested individual’s release so that ICE may assume custody.99 
Previously, under Secure Communities, ICE officials had taken a further step 
of requesting that local jails hold the noncitizen for up to forty-eight hours after 
 
focus most immigration-enforcement resources on criminals, recent border crossers, and se-
rious violators of the immigration laws”). 
 96. Johnson Memorandum on Secure Communities, supra note 2 (revoking previous 
enforcement guidance and explaining the need for a new name that better reflects ICE’s fo-
cus on certain immigration priorities); Morton Memorandum on Exercising Prosecutorial 
Discretion, supra note 95 (directing the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in removing 
those regarded as priorities, a practice that continues even though this memorandum was re-
voked as of November 20, 2014); FY 2013 ICE Immigration Removals, supra note 95 (dis-
cussing immigration removal priorities).  
 97. See Morton Memorandum on Civil Immigration Enforcement, supra note 1; see 
also Secure Communities, supra note 2 (“In addition to criminal aliens, ICE focuses on re-
cent illegal entrants, repeat violators who game the immigration system, those who fail to 
appear at immigration hearings, and fugitives who have already been ordered removed by an 
immigration judge.”).  
 98. See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
to Thomas S. Winkowski et al., Policies for the Apprehension, Detention and Removal of 
Undocumented Immigrants (Nov. 20, 2014) (establishing priorities effective January 5, 
2015). 
 99. Johnson Memorandum on Secure Communities, supra note 2. 
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she would otherwise be eligible for release, so as to give immigration officials 
additional time to assume custody.100  
Arrests play a significant role in shaping how immigration enforcement un-
folds today. As of April 2014, ICE reported that close to 300,000 noncitizens 
had been removed after identification through Secure Communities.101 ICE al-
so reported overwhelming success in removing noncitizens who fell into one of 
its general priority areas, with ninety-eight percent of its 2013 removals report-
edly fitting into a stated removal priority.102  
Notably, however, these statistics do not capture how many of those re-
moved are also criminal justice priorities. Focusing just on interior removals—
as opposed to those that occur at the border—approximately twenty percent of 
those deported had no known criminal convictions at the time of removal.103 
Of those with a criminal history, approximately thirty percent had a single mis-
demeanor conviction.104 Since unlawful entry itself is a misdemeanor,105 these 
statistics do not capture how many of those deported had no criminal record un-
related to their immigration history.  
Why have immigration officials chosen to utilize criminal arrests as an 
immigration enforcement tool? One explanation is that arrests provide an op-
portunity for immigration enforcement officials to expand the reach of interior 
enforcement efforts.106 Border control alone is an ineffective way of achieving 
immigration enforcement. Large numbers of unauthorized noncitizens enter le-
 
100. The detainer portion of the program was abandoned with the transition from Se-
cure Communities to the Priority Enforcement Program. See id. 
101. Secure Communities: Get the Facts, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT 
http://web.archive.org/web/20140910121059/http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/get 
-the-facts.htm (accessed via the Internet Archive index) (archived Sept. 10, 2014) (“Through 
April 30, 2015, more than 283,000 convicted criminal aliens were removed from the United 
States after identification through Secure Communities.”); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTA-
BILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-708, SECURE COMMUNITIES: CRIMINAL ALIEN REMOVALS IN-
CREASED, BUT TECHNOLOGY PLANNING IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED 14 (2012) (stating that ap-
proximately twenty percent of ICE removals in 2010 and the early part of 2011 were 
attributed to Secure Communities). 
102. FY 2013 ICE Immigration Removals, supra note 95.  
103. Id.  
104. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, supra note 1, at 2 & n.4 (reporting 
52,935 interior removals of those who had committed Level 1 offenses; 26,203 interior re-
movals of those who had previously committed Level 2 offenses; and 30,977 interior remov-
als of those who had previously committed Level 3 offenses, and describing Level 3 offenses 
as a single misdemeanor conviction); see also U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCE-
MENT, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., SECURE COMMUNITIES: MONTHLY STATISTICS 
THROUGH SEPT. 30, 2013, at 2 (2013) (reporting, without making a distinction between inte-
rior and border removals, that in FY 2013, Secure Communities was used to identify and 
remove 22,561 Level 3 offenders, as compared to 18,067 Level 2 offenders and 28,683 Lev-
el 1 offenders).  
105. See 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (2013). 
106. See U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., supra note 93, at 1-2 (discussing how sharing 
data with state, tribal, and local law enforcement will increase the speed with which ICE 
identifies criminal aliens in local law enforcement custody). 
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gally, but then overstay their visas.107 Arrests provide a way for immigration 
enforcement officials to delegate enforcement responsibilities to state and local 
police, who, in turn, take responsibility for some of the work of identifying and 
removing unauthorized noncitizens from the interior of the United States.108  
In this manner, arrests can be said to function as an ex post immigration 
screening device. In an influential article, Adam Cox and Eric Posner argue that 
states can achieve their immigration regulatory goals through either ex ante or 
ex post screening. Ex ante screening is done “on the basis of pre-entry infor-
mation, such as the immigrant’s race or her educational achievement in her 
home country,” while ex post screening selects noncitizens for removal “on the 
basis of post-entry information, such as her avoidance of criminal activity or 
unemployment in the host country.”109 The ex ante approach focuses on border 
exclusion, and the ex post approach is necessarily based on deportation.110 In 
the context of undocumented immigration, Cox and Posner argue that ex post 
screening allows the state to gather information about noncitizens over time 
and to selectively focus on deporting certain unauthorized immigrants who are 
regarded as priorities—such as those who come into contact with the criminal 
justice system.111 Arrests serve as a way of selectively examining some noncit-
izens for removal, while ignoring others.  
This approach can also conserve enforcement dollars. As compared to oth-
er alternatives—such as street sweeps or workplace raids—arrests give immi-
gration enforcement officials a limited and captive population to screen. If local 
jails choose to comply with notification requests, immigration enforcement of-
ficials need only transfer arrested individuals from criminal to immigration cus-
tody prior to their release, rather than invest resources trying to locate them. 
Politics provides another explanation. Deportation creates the potential for 
backlash, particularly when unauthorized immigrants reside in the United 
States long term, form strong community ties, and raise children in the United 
States.112 For immigration officials, forging a link between immigration and 
 
107. JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CTR., THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 
UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION IN THE U.S.: ESTIMATES BASED ON THE MARCH 2005 
CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY 1, 16 (2006), available at http://www.pewhispanic.org/files 
/reports/61.pdf (finding that in 2006, of the approximately eleven million unauthorized im-
migrants in the United States, twenty-five to forty percent entered lawfully but overstayed a 
visa); see Martin, supra note 94, at 544 (“Border enforcement contributes almost nothing to 
the deterrence or apprehension of [visa] overstayers.”). 
108. Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, Delegation in Immigration Law, 79 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1285, 1337-40 (2012) (discussing the benefits of delegating enforcement authority). 
109. Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration Law, 
59 STAN. L. REV. 809, 812 (2007) (emphasis omitted). 
110. See id.  
111. Id. at 826-27. 
112. See Hiroshi Motomura, Choosing Immigrants, Making Citizens, 59 STAN. L. REV. 
857, 867 (2007) (“[D]eliberate underenforcement [of immigration law] is more a product of 
political considerations than constitutional ones. Underenforcement . . . is the path of least 
political resistance.”); Pham, supra note 17, at 968-69 (discussing the norm of under-
enforcement of immigration law).  
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crime control can serve as a way of solidifying political support for immigra-
tion enforcement policies. This point is related to Jonathan Simon’s observa-
tion: “Across all kinds of institutional settings, people are seen as acting legiti-
mately when they act to prevent crimes or other troubling behaviors that can be 
closely analogized to crimes.”113 In the immigration context, the link between 
arrests and deportation can serve to legitimate immigration enforcement choic-
es by demonstrating that immigration enforcement officials are focusing on 
“criminal aliens,” and not on those who may be seen as having more compel-
ling claims to membership, such as long-term unauthorized immigrants who 
have had no contact with the criminal justice system.114 
Finally, the Priority Enforcement Program and its predecessor, Secure 
Communities, can be understood as efforts to partner with state and local po-
lice, while simultaneously limiting their influence. Immigration enforcement 
has been subject to trenchant criticism for delegating much of its enforcement 
power to state and local police, whose interests may diverge from those of fed-
eral immigration enforcement officials.115 The effects of immigration are felt 
locally and unequally.116 Six states are home to nearly sixty percent of the na-
tion’s unauthorized immigrant population.117 When state and local police di-
rectly enforce immigration law,118 they have incentives to respond to local sen-
timent, rather than to federal immigration goals. This creates the potential for 
 
113. JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANS-
FORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 4 (2007).  
114. Cf. Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference that Alienage 
Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 1055 (1994) (arguing that at times, the law treats alienage 
as an “irrelevant and illegitimate” means of classifying people, and instead looks to other 
markers of membership); Eagly, supra note 18, at 1137 (arguing that “rather than two sharp-
ly divided categories of noncitizens (‘lawful’ and ‘unlawful’), noncitizen status can more 
accurately be understood as existing along a spectrum”). 
115. See Scott H. Decker et al., Immigration and Local Policing: Results from a Na-
tional Survey of Law Enforcement Executives, in ANITA KHASHU, POLICE FOUND., THE ROLE 
OF LOCAL POLICE: STRIKING A BALANCE BETWEEN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND CIVIL 
LIBERTIES app. G at 169, 176 (2009) (discussing variation in local police departments’ re-
sponse to immigration issues); Cox & Posner, supra note 108, at 1291 (“In a principal-agent 
model, the principal hires an agent to perform a task that benefits the principal. The agent’s 
preferences and the principal’s preferences are not the same.”); Wishnie, supra note 17, at 
1102 (discussing the potential for racial profiling by local law enforcement to skew immigra-
tion outcomes).  
116. For a discussion of local responses to immigration, see generally Cristina M. Ro-
driguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567 
(2008).  
117. Andrea Caumont, These Six States Were Home to 60% of Unauthorized Immi-
grants in 2012, PEW RES. CENTER, http://www.pewhispanic.org/2013/09/23/unauthorized 
-immigration/2-3 (Sept. 23, 2013) (listing California, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, New 
York, and Texas). 
118. Direct police enforcement of immigration law can occur through “287(g) agree-
ments” (referring to section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act). These agree-
ments permit police officers who complete certain training requirements to enforce federal 
immigration law directly. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2013). For a discussion of 287(g) agreements, 
see Chacón, supra note 19, at 1582-86. 
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local police to focus on suspected unauthorized immigrants, rather than on sus-
pected criminals.119 The Priority Enforcement Program can be understood as 
an effort to use arrests in service of immigration screening, while also attempt-
ing to safeguard against the possibility that local law enforcement will subvert 
federal immigration enforcement goals to their own agendas.  
Arrests thus hold considerable appeal as a means of immigration enforce-
ment. But as a matter of institutional design, reliance on arrests can have im-
portant unintended consequences. Arrests themselves can be unreliable proxies. 
Arrest data may be linked to the wrong person—particularly when arrested in-
dividuals have common names or provide false identification at the time of 
their arrest.120 Relatedly, given that ICE’s stated focus is on identifying and 
deporting those who commit serious crimes, it is important to recognize that the 
connection between criminality and unauthorized immigration is mixed at best. 
Documented immigrants are generally incarcerated at lower rates than U.S. cit-
izens,121 and the evidence is unclear as to whether there is any link between 
 
119. The potential for abuse has been demonstrated in several lawsuits alleging racial 
profiling of immigrants by police. See, e.g., Melendres v. Arpaio, 989 F. Supp. 2d 822, 825-
26 (D. Ariz. 2013); Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Joseph Maturo, 
Jr., Mayor, Town of East Haven, Conn. 2-4 (Dec. 19, 2011), available at http://www.justice 
.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/easthaven_findletter_12-19-11.pdf (noting that shortly after a 
rapid increase in the Latino population, police engaged in racial harassment and profiling of 
Latinos); Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Bill Montgomery, Cnty. 
Att’y, Maricopa Cnty., Ariz. 8 (Dec. 15, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about 
/spl/documents/mcso_findletter_12-15-11.pdf (citing police testimony that criminal arrests at 
day laborer hiring sites were conducted in response to citizen complaints about the presence 
of “dark-complected people” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Devon W. 
Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Undocumented Criminal Procedure, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1543, 
1546-50 (2011) (discussing how immigration enforcement legitimizes racial profiling by po-
lice). 
120. The scope of the problem is difficult to quantify, given that many victims of identi-
ty theft are unaware of the theft. For anecdotal evidence, see, for example, Robert Faturechi 
& Jack Leonard, ID Errors Put Hundreds in County Jail, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 25, 2011), http:// 
articles.latimes.com/print/2011/dec/25/local/la-me-wrong-id-20111225 (recounting that in 
Los Angeles, more than 1480 people were arrested by mistake over the course of five years); 
Dan Frosch, Mistaken Identity Cases at Heart of Denver Lawsuit over Wrongful Arrests, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/16/us/lawsuit-in-denver-over 
-hundreds-of-mistaken-arrests.html (reporting systemic cases of mistaken arrest warrant in-
formation, based on common names or misspellings); Robert Patrick & Jennifer S. Mann, 
Jailed by Mistake, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Oct. 26, 2013), http://www.stltoday.com/news 
/multimedia/special/st-louis-wrongful-arrests-mount-as-fingerprint-mismatches-are-ignored 
/html_b153a232-208f-5d0b-86a1-ba3256f7a941.html (reporting that St. Louis residents who 
had been mistakenly arrested due to common names collectively spent more than 2000 days 
in jail from 2005 to 2013, or an average of about three weeks each, and that one man alone 
was incarcerated 211 days). 
121. Sklansky, supra note 18, at 190-93 (describing trends in immigrant crime rates). 
Sklansky also offers evidence that certain border towns with high percentages of undocu-
mented immigrants have relatively low crime rates. Id. at 191. 
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unauthorized immigration and high crime rates.122 And since the majority of 
arrests are for minor crimes, immigration screening disproportionately occurs 
with respect to those arrested for minor alleged offenses, as opposed to the 
more serious crimes that are ICE’s stated focus. 
Second, the efficacy of this system is constrained by the scope of the DHS 
fingerprint database. The DHS database only includes those who previously 
encountered immigration officials—not those who secretly crossed the border 
and thus were never in contact with immigration officials.123 Immigration en-
forcement officials depict the Priority Enforcement Program and its predeces-
sor as offering a way to conduct immigration screening on everyone who has 
been arrested, but as a practical matter, reliance on arrests leads immigration 
enforcement officials to overselect those who overstayed a visa, and to 
underselect those who secretly crossed the border.   
Third, enforcement necessarily depends on whether jails cooperate with 
ICE notification requests prior to the release of inmates. Widespread refusal to 
comply with detainers played a role in undermining the efficacy of Secure 
Communities—a fact that ICE acknowledged in transitioning to the Priority 
Enforcement Program.124 If local law enforcement agencies continue to ignore 
ICE’s new requests for notification, then immigration enforcement officials 
will have limited ability to apprehend suspected unauthorized immigrants, even 
after reviewing their arrest information.  
Despite these limitations, arrests have become a powerful tool for immigra-
tion enforcement officials. Thus, arrests for petty offenses and arrests that lead 
to no further consequences in the criminal justice system can lead to significant 
immigration consequences, ones that can far outstrip any penalty imposed by 
the criminal justice system. 
B. Public Housing 
Public housing officials rely on arrests to identify existing tenants who are 
potentially in breach of their lease. Federal law provides that public housing 
 
122. Eagly, supra note 18, at 1202 (“We still know little about the criminal propensities 
of undocumented immigrants, given the obvious difficulty in counting this group both in the 
offender and general populations.”). 
123. Of the 11.1 million unauthorized immigrants in the United States, an estimated six-
ty to seventy-five percent entered without inspection, as opposed to entering lawfully and 
then remaining without authorization (such as by overstaying a visa). See PASSEL, supra note 
107, at 1, 16; see also Martin, supra note 94, at 544. 
124. Johnson Memorandum on Secure Communities, supra note 2, at 2 & n.1 (discuss-
ing several court decisions that found ICE detainers to be unconstitutional). Detainers were 
not supported by probable cause, yet requested that jails hold arrested individuals after they 
would otherwise be eligible for release. Some courts found detainers to be unconstitutional 
for this reason. See, e.g., Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cnty., No. 3:12-cv-02317-ST, 
2014 WL 1414305, at *11 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014); see also Thomas J. Miles & Adam B. 
Cox, Does Immigration Enforcement Reduce Crime? Evidence from Secure Communities, 57 
J.L. & ECON. 937, 963 (2014) (discussing detainer noncompliance).  
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tenants are subject to eviction if any household member or guest engages in any 
criminal or drug-related activity. Leases for public housing prohibit a “tenant, 
member of the tenant’s household or guest” from engaging in “any criminal ac-
tivity . . . that threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the 
[public housing authority’s] premises” or from engaging in any “drug-related 
criminal activity . . . on or off the premises.”125 In a 2002 decision, Department 
of Housing & Urban Development v. Rucker, the Supreme Court interpreted 
this language to permit eviction in cases where the leaseholder did not know 
and had no reason to know of drug use or other criminal activity by a guest or 
household member.126  
Public housing authorities use arrests as a way to learn of and enforce po-
tential lease violations. Some public housing authorities learn of arrests by 
monitoring the premises, while others regularly obtain police reports for arrests 
that take place in public housing.127 
Public housing authorities rely on arrests for some of the same reasons as 
immigration enforcement officials. Public housing is a scarce resource, and 
prospective tenants often spend years on waiting lists before being offered a 
unit.128 Applicants are subject to background checks, income verification, and 
other strict entry requirements.129 Once admitted, tenants continue to be moni-
 
125. 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(l)(5)(i)-(ii) (2014). In public housing, a tenant may be evicted 
even without an arrest; the lease may be terminated “regardless of whether the covered per-
son has been arrested or convicted for such activity and without satisfying the standard of 
proof used for a criminal conviction.” Id. § 966.4(l)(5)(iii)(A) (stating that in conventional 
public housing, a public housing agency may terminate assistance); id. § 982.553(c) (stating 
the same in the context of the Section 8 voucher program). The arrest thus provides a practi-
cal—but not necessary—way for landlords to learn of conduct that may potentially violate 
the lease. 
126. 535 U.S. 125, 136 (2002).  
127. See Stevens v. Hous. Auth., No. 3:08-CV-51, 2008 WL 2857470, at *3 (N.D. Ind. 
July 22, 2008) (noting that eviction proceedings were initiated after the Housing Authority 
received a police report of a crime in a public housing residence); see also OFFICE OF PUB. & 
INDIAN HOUS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., PIH 96-16 (HA), “ONE STRIKE AND 
YOU’RE OUT” SCREENING AND EVICTION GUIDELINES FOR PUBLIC HOUSING AUTHORITIES 
(HAS) 8 (1996) (urging implementing housing authorities to promptly obtain relevant inci-
dent reports from police departments to provide for timely evictions); Regina Austin, “Step 
on a Crack, Break Your Mother’s Back”: Poor Moms, Myths of Authority, and Drug-Related 
Evictions from Public Housing, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 273, 278 n.21 (2002) (“Some 
housing authorities rely on addresses given by arrestees and recorded in arrest records . . . to 
identify candidates for eviction . . . .”). 
128. In New York City alone, there were 247,262 families on the waitlist for conven-
tional public housing and 121,999 families on the waitlist for section 8 housing as of March 
17, 2014, and the vacancy rate was reported as less than one percent. About NYCHA: Fact 
Sheet, N.Y.C. HOUSING AUTHORITY, http://www.nyc.gov/html/nycha/html/about/factsheet 
.shtml (last visited Mar. 30, 2015). 
129. 42 U.S.C. § 1437a (2013) (requiring annual reviews of family income to ensure the 
tenants continue to meet the low-income eligibility requirement); id. § 13661(c) (indicating 
that admission may be denied to those who have “engaged in any drug-related or violent 
criminal activity or other criminal activity which would adversely affect the health, safety, or 
right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other residents”). 
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tored. They are subject to eviction if they no longer meet the eligibility criteria, 
or are convicted or charged with certain crimes.130 In this sense, contact with 
the criminal justice system serves as the first step in a screening process that 
may lead to eviction. The stated goals are to reduce drug dealing and to allocate 
scarce spots to law-abiding tenants.131  
Arrests provide a way for public housing authorities to learn of conduct 
that potentially violates the lease. This use of arrests may also be seen as a cost-
efficient way of reducing crime. Tenants in public housing—as in other hous-
ing—are entitled to privacy, and their homes may not be searched without a 
warrant. But police need no warrant if they have probable cause for a street ar-
rest, including for minor offenses such as loitering and open container viola-
tions. It can be less costly for landlords to learn about drug use through street 
stops and arrests, rather than through police warrants or gaining permission to 
search a home.132 Arrests thus give public housing authorities a relatively in-
expensive tool for monitoring the postadmission conduct of tenants and for en-
forcing breach of contract claims. 
That is not to say that public housing’s and immigration enforcement’s us-
es of arrests are one and the same. One difference is that crime in public hous-
ing is a well-established problem, one that motivated Congress to pass “one-
strike” housing eviction laws.133 Another key difference is that in the housing 
context, tenants cannot be evicted unless the landlord establishes that a member 
of the household breached her contract. In contrast, undocumented immigrants 
are legally removable because of their unauthorized status alone. In addition, 
 
130. Id. § 13662(a) (listing grounds for termination of tenancy); see also Pinard, supra 
note 13, at 491-92.  
131. Corinne A. Carey, No Second Chance: People with Criminal Records Denied Ac-
cess to Public Housing, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 545, 553 (2005) (“Language in HUD’s handbook 
on the ‘one strike’ policy explicitly addresses the zero-sum nature of public housing choices: 
‘In deciding whether to admit applicants who are borderline in the PHA’s evaluation pro-
cess, the PHA should recognize that for every marginal applicant it admits, it is not admit-
ting another applicant who clearly meets the PHA’s evaluation standards.’” (quoting U.S. 
DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., DIRECTIVE 7465.1 REV-2, PUBLIC HOUSING OCCUPANCY 
HANDBOOK § 4-3(b)(3) (1987))); Lisa Weil, Drug-Related Evictions in Public Housing: 
Congress’ Addiction to a Quick Fix, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 161, 169 (1991) (arguing that 
justifications for one-strike housing policies relate to the desire to keep tenants safe, respect 
the wishes of law-abiding tenants who support tough-on-crime evictions, and prevent drug 
dealers from accessing publicly subsidized homes). Former U.S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD) official Laura Blackburne has been quoted as saying, “People 
who commit crimes have no right to public housing . . . . Why should I keep some creep in 
there who doesn’t care about decent living?” Douglas Martin, Innocent People Lose Homes: 
Law’s Strange Twist, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1992, at B3 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
132. See generally William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 
VA. L. REV. 881, 887-88 (1991) (discussing the costs of obtaining a search warrant relative 
to other means of investigation). 
133. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 127 (2002) (“With drug 
dealers ‘increasingly imposing a reign of terror on public and other federally assisted low-
income housing tenants,’ Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.” (quoting 42 
U.S.C. § 11901(3))).  
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although federal law mandates that the language at issue in Rucker be included 
in lease agreements, there is no nationwide system for sharing arrest infor-
mation akin to the Priority Enforcement Program. It is also considerably more 
difficult to obtain data about how many evictions are triggered by arrests. 
While the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) pub-
lishes significant data on public housing occupants, it does not report how 
many tenants are evicted following an arrest.134  
Public housing authorities must comply with certain procedural constraints 
in seeking eviction, but the procedures applied in housing court and in adminis-
trative termination hearings are distinct from those applied in criminal court. In 
criminal court, an arrest report itself cannot be used to establish that a crime 
occurred; the arresting officer or another witness must testify to the facts. But 
housing court and administrative termination proceedings grant considerably 
more discretion. Some administrative proceedings allow landlords to introduce 
unverified arrest reports as substantive evidence, even without testimony from 
the arresting officer.135 And as a practical matter, tenants who are largely un-
represented by counsel have limited ability to contest the procedures used in 
housing court or to mount a substantive defense.136  
In relying on arrests, public housing authorities knowingly make decisions 
that affect tenants who pose no known risk to others; eviction decisions affect 
the entire household, not just the arrested individual.137 Consider the eviction 
of Pearlie Rucker, one of the plaintiffs in the Rucker case. A sixty-three-year-
old grandmother, she was evicted with her family when her daughter was ar-
rested for a minor offense several blocks away.138 At the time of her eviction, 
she had lived in public housing for thirteen years and provided a compelling 
example of the broad reach of “one-strike” public housing evictions.139 She 
 
134. The data collected and published by HUD are available at Research, U.S. DEP’T 
HOUSING & URB. DEV., http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/library/bookshelf03 (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2015). 
135. See Basco v. Machin, 514 F.3d 1177, 1179-80 (11th Cir. 2008) (discussing section 
8 termination proceedings involving a hearsay police report). But see Edgecomb v. Hous. 
Auth., 824 F. Supp. 312, 315-16 (D. Conn. 1993) (finding an informal section 8 hearing that 
relied on a hearsay police report to be improper because it denied the “tenant the opportunity 
to confront and cross-examine persons who supplied information upon which the housing 
authority’s action is grounded”). 
136. See Matthew Desmond, Eviction and the Reproduction of Urban Poverty, 118 AM. 
J. SOC. 88, 123 (2012); Matthew Desmond, Op-Ed., Tipping the Scales in Housing Court, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/30/opinion/tipping-the-scales 
-in-housing-court.html. 
137. This is true of evictions that are based on a household member’s conviction, as 
well as evictions that are based on arrests. Martin, supra note 131 (discussing evictions of 
mothers based on drug offenses of children).  
138. Rucker v. Davis, No. C 98-00781 CRB, 1998 WL 345403, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 
19, 1998). 
139. Id. For a discussion of “one-strike” public housing evictions, see Remarks An-
nouncing the “One Strike and You’re Out” Initiative in Public Housing, 1 PUB. PAPERS 519, 
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shared her apartment with her mentally disabled adult daughter, Gelinda, two 
grandchildren, and one great-grandchild.140 She had no knowledge of drug use 
in her household and had made good-faith efforts to keep out drugs, such as by 
searching Gelinda’s bedroom regularly for signs of drug use.141 She also had a 
son, Michael, who did not live in the apartment.142  
Gelinda’s and Michael’s arrests led to Rucker’s eviction. Gelinda was ar-
rested after being spotted with an open container. Police found cocaine during 
the subsequent search.143 About six months later, an officer arrested Michael 
after reportedly observing him loitering at a bus stop.144 When searched, he 
was also found to be carrying cocaine.145 At the precinct, Michael gave Ruck-
er’s address as his own.146 Three months later, and about nine months after 
Gelinda’s arrest, an eviction notice was served on Pearlie Rucker.147 The ter-
mination notice cited Michael’s and Gelinda’s drug-related arrests as evidence 
of breach of contract.148 Rucker did not dispute the legality of the arrests or 
that Michael and Gelinda were using drugs. Instead, she challenged whether 
she could be evicted for the off-premises conduct of household members. 
The Rucker Court held that federal law “unambiguously requires lease 
terms that vest local public housing authorities with the discretion to evict ten-
ants for the drug-related activity of household members and guests whether or 
not the tenant knew, or should have known, about the activity.”149 The Court 
stressed that public housing authorities have discretionary authority to evict 
tenants:  
The statute does not require the eviction of any tenant who violated the lease 
provision. Instead, it entrusts that decision to the local public housing authori-
ties, who are in the best position to take account of, among other things, the 
degree to which the housing project suffers from “rampant drug-related or vio-
lent crime,” “the seriousness of the offending action,” and “the extent to which 
the leaseholder has . . . taken all reasonable steps to prevent or mitigate the of-
fending action.” It is not “absurd” that a local housing authority may some-
times evict a tenant who had no knowledge of the drug-related activity.150  
 
520 (Mar. 28, 1996) (“If you break the law, you no longer have a home in public housing, 
‘one strike and you’re out.’ That should be the law everywhere in America.”). 
140. Rucker, 1998 WL 345403, at *2.  
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. Joint Appendix at 13, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 
(2002) (Nos. 00-1770, 00-1781), 2001 WL 34093958. 
144. Id. 
145. Rucker, 1998 WL 345403, at *2. 
146. Joint Appendix, supra note 143, at 13. 
147. Id. at 12. 
148. Id. at 12-13. 
149. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 130 (2002). 
150. Id. at 133-34 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting 42 U.S.C. 
§ 11901(2); 66 Fed. Reg. 28,776, 28,803 (May 24, 2001)). 
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After Rucker, HUD issued administrative guidance that urged public hous-
ing authorities to consider a number of factors, including “the seriousness of 
the violation, the effect that eviction of the entire household would have on 
household members not involved in the criminal activity, and the willingness of 
the head of household to remove the wrongdoing household member from the 
lease as a condition for continued occupancy.”151  
In practice, the willingness of the head of the household to “cure” the 
breach by barring the arrested individual often plays a decisive role in eviction 
decisions. For instance, the New York City Housing Authority termination of 
tenancy procedures provide that a hearing officer may allow a tenant to contin-
ue to reside in a complex, subject to the “permanent exclusion” of the arrested 
individual, in lieu of an eviction.152  
Arrests give public housing authorities a credible basis for threatening 
eviction. They also provide leverage in obtaining concessions from households, 
such as an agreement that the tenant will bar the arrested individual from entry. 
Such stipulations give landlords more control over who enters an apartment 
than they would otherwise have, and may be far more common than termina-
tion proceedings.153 A typical lease may bar those who are not listed as occu-
pants from residing in an apartment, but it will not restrict who may visit. In 
contrast, stipulations may bar the arrested individual from merely entering a 
dwelling for any reason.154  
In the housing context, the use of arrests as a screening device can in some 
circumstances satisfy important safety goals. But reliance on arrests can lead to 
significant and undesirable consequences for an entire household, particularly 
when tenants lack adequate opportunity to explain why an arrest should not 
lead to ongoing monitoring or eviction.  
C. Other Contexts 
A number of other actors also rely on arrest information as a way of 
screening and monitoring arrested individuals, including employers, profes-
sional license providers, foster care agencies, social services providers, and ed-
ucational providers.  
 
151. Letter from Michael M. Liu, Assistant Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 
to Pub. Hous. Dirs. (June 6, 2002), available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/regs/rucker 
6jun2002.pdf. 
152. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., Termination of Tenancy Procedures 2-3 (1997) (on file with 
author). 
153. See Letter from James M. Branden, Chair, Criminal Justice Operations Comm., 
N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n, to John B. Rhea, Chairman, N.Y.C. Hous. Auth. (Jan. 11, 2011), availa-
ble at http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20071995-RecommendationsreTermination 
ofTenancyProceedings.pdf (citing statistics that over half of all cases in 2007 were resolved 
by stipulation, rather than through a hearing). 
154. See id. (discussing the need to explain “permanent exclusion” to tenants who 
choose to enter stipulations to remain in public housing).  
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1. Employment 
Employers and professional licensing authorities can use arrest information 
to monitor off-duty workers. The vast majority of employers require at least 
some employees to undergo background checks as a condition of employ-
ment.155 A significant number of employers now also receive notifications 
whenever an employee is arrested and fingerprinted.156 Every state has a crim-
inal justice repository that maintains databases of fingerprints and criminal rec-
ords, including the fingerprints of certain public employees or licensees.157 If 
an employee is later arrested, her fingerprints are sent to the state law enforce-
ment repository during the booking process, which then may automatically no-
tify the employer or licensing agency.158  
In New York, arrest data are automatically transmitted to dozens of public 
employers and licensing authorities, such as the New York City Department of 
Education, New York State Department of Education, New York City Taxi and 
Limousine Commission, and others.159 Home health care workers, security 
 
155. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 85, at 6 (“In one survey, a 
total of 92% of responding employers stated that they subjected all or some of their job can-
didates to criminal background checks. Employers have reported that their use of criminal 
history information is related to ongoing efforts to combat theft and fraud, as well as height-
ened concerns about workplace violence and potential liability for negligent hir-
ing. Employers also cite federal laws as well as state and local laws as reasons for using 
criminal background checks.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Devah Pager, The Mark of a 
Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 937 (2003) (discussing the effect of a criminal record on 
barriers to employment).  
156. Ellen Nakashima, FBI Prepares Vast Database of Biometrics, WASH. POST (Dec. 
22, 2007), http://wapo.st/1xunkJZ (discussing the FBI’s “‘rap-back’ service, under which 
employers could ask the FBI to keep employees’ fingerprints in the database, subject to state 
privacy laws, so that if that [sic] employees are ever arrested or charged with a crime, the 
employers would be notified”). 
157. Jacobs, supra note 78, at 393 (“Every U.S. state has a state-level agency charged 
with maintaining databases of rap sheets and fingerprints. In New York, for example, that 
agency is called the Division of Criminal Justice Services. The corresponding California 
agency is the California Department of Justice, California Justice Information Services Divi-
sion.” (footnote omitted)). 
158. For a list of reporting requirements in New York State, see, for example, LEGAL 
ACTION CTR., NEW YORK STATE: OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING SURVEY (2006), available at 
http://lac.org/doc_library/lac/publications/Occupational%20Licensing%20Survey%202006 
.pdf; N.Y. State Div. of Criminal Justice Servs., Use and Dissemination Agreement 5 (2009) 
(on file with author) (stating that the Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) agrees to 
retain “non-criminal applicant fingerprint cards in its files for the purpose of issuing reports 
to the User Agency upon the subsequent arrest of the subjects of the retained fingerprint 
cards”). 
159. New York City Governmental Agencies Having Use and Dissemination Agree-
ments with New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services (on file with author); New 
York State Governmental Agencies Having Use and Dissemination Agreements with New 
York State Division of Criminal Justice Services (on file with author). This information was 
obtained in response to a Freedom of Information Law request to the New York State Divi-
sion of Criminal Justice Services. The author thanks Paul Keefe of the Community Service 
Society of New York. 
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guards, and taxi drivers are among those whose employers or license providers 
may automatically be notified of an arrest. Neither the arresting officer nor the 
jail has a role in initiating the notification, so the arrested individual will not be 
informed of the notification at the time of her arrest.  
The transmission occurs once and contains limited information. In New 
York, the notification contains the arrested individual’s identifying information, 
the date and location of the arrest, the arrest charges (as listed by the arresting 
officer), and the penal code section relating to the arrest; the transmission does 
not contain the alleged factual basis for the arrest.160  
Licensing authorities and employers have considerable discretion in decid-
ing how to proceed after learning of an arrest.161 Some employers use arrest 
notifications in tandem with self-reporting requirements.162 Failure to comply 
with this self-reporting requirement may itself be the basis of employee disci-
pline or termination.163  
Some employers suspend or terminate at-will employees based on the ar-
rest. As a matter of due process, a licensee may be entitled to a hearing before a 
license is revoked, but not necessarily before an unpaid license suspension.164 
Until 2006, New York City taxi drivers, for instance, had their licenses auto-
matically suspended for a wide range of arrests, including misdemeanor wel-
fare fraud or forgery.165 Employers also vary in terms of how they disseminate 
arrest information. The New York City Department of Education, for instance, 
disseminates employee arrest information to the general counsel’s office, hu-
man resources, the district superintendent, and to the Special Commissioner of 
Investigation.166 Some arrested individuals will never know that they were 
screened because their employer might take no immediate action—but the em-
 
160. Nnebe v. Daus, 665 F. Supp. 2d 311, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (describing the trans-
mission process from the DCJS in the context of a lawsuit challenging automatic license 
suspensions of arrested taxi drivers), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 644 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 
2011).  
161. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 85, at 12 (“An arrest, how-
ever, may in some circumstances trigger an inquiry into whether the conduct underlying the 
arrest justifies an adverse employment action.”); cf. Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 932 
(1997) (“On the other side of the balance, the State has a significant interest in immediately 
suspending, when felony charges are filed against them, employees who occupy positions of 
great public trust and high public visibility, such as police officers.”). 
162. N.Y.C. DEP’T OF EDUC., C-105, BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS OF PEDAGOGICAL 
AND ADMINISTRATIVE APPLICANTS AND PROCEDURES IN CASES OF THE ARREST OF EMPLOYEES 
7 (2003), available at http://docs.nycenet.edu/docushare/dsweb/Get/Document-55/C-105.pdf 
(discussing self-reporting requirements). 
163. Id. 
164. Nnebe, 644 F.3d at 159 (“[W]e think that in any given case, an arrest for a felony 
or serious misdemeanor creates a strong government interest in ensuring that the public is 
protected in the short term, prior to any hearing [for an arrested taxi driver].”); see Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Qualified Immunity: § 1983 Litigation in the Public Employment Context, 21 
TOURO L. REV. 551, 553-54 (2005). 
165. Nnebe, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 316-17. 
166. N.Y.C. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 162, at 7-8. 
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ployer may consider the arrest at a later date when making decisions about 
whom to promote or terminate.  
Depending on the circumstances, an employee might be asked to explain 
the arrest, or she may be suspended pending the disposition.167 Employers may 
have an interest in suspending or reassigning workers because they are con-
cerned about liability for negligence claims—such as negligent hiring and re-
tention—if they do nothing after learning of an arrest.168 
Like immigration enforcement officials and public housing authorities, 
employers and licensing agencies use arrests as one potential monitoring tool. 
They could also rely on a number of other methods. For instance, they could 
rely on subjective methods, such as the complaints of other workers, or more 
objective methods, such as a drug screening. When employers rely on these 
types of methods, they have incentives to ensure fairness and compliance with 
antidiscrimination laws. If an employer relies on drug screening, for instance, it 
cannot disproportionately target minorities. But when employers and licensing 
authorities rely on arrests, they leave front-end decisions about whom to screen 
to the police, without similar regard for racially disparate impact. Employers 
may also treat arrests as independently reliable, rather than engage in their own 
investigation. Reliance on arrests carries the risk that the arrest will be an unre-
liable proxy, for reasons relating to the inaccuracy of the arrest itself or because 
the arrest does not correlate to characteristics that the employer values. And 
even if arrests are a reasonable proxy, they might nonetheless be overly broad 
and unfairly exclude qualified employees.169 
When employers and licensing agencies rely on arrests, they might be mo-
tivated by rational interests, such as the desire to prevent harm to third parties 
and others who rely on their services. But without appropriate checks, their use 
of arrests can result in significant harm, including lengthy unpaid suspensions 
for workers who were unlawfully arrested or pose no security risk. 
2. Child protective services 
Some police departments now have protocols in place for notifying social 
services after a custodial parent’s arrest.170 As a matter of due process, police 
 
167. Id. at 8. 
168. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 78, at 38. 
169. A recent class action lawsuit against the U.S. Census Bureau raises some of these 
concerns. The plaintiffs allege that the Census Bureau’s practice of requiring applicants 
“who have ever been arrested to produce within 30 days the ‘official court documentation’ 
for any and all of their arrests—regardless of whether a conviction resulted, the nature of the 
arrest, its relationship to the job, or when it took place”—eliminated ninety-three percent of 
applicants from eligibility and had a significantly adverse impact on Latinos and African 
Americans, who are disproportionately arrested as compared to whites. Second Amended 
Class Action Complaint at 1-2, Houser v. Blank, 10-cv-3105 (FM) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 
2012). 
170. See CAL. COMM’N ON PEACE OFFICER STANDARDS & TRAINING, POST GUIDELINES 
FOR CHILD SAFETY: WHEN A CUSTODIAL PARENT OR GUARDIAN IS ARRESTED 5 (2008), avail-
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have a relatively minimal obligation to provide for the immediate safety of 
children if they are aware that children may experience harm as a result of their 
caretaker’s arrest.171 But due in part to a growing awareness of how parental 
arrests can affect children, some police departments have expanded their efforts 
to address the needs of potentially vulnerable children after a caretaker’s arrest. 
Rising arrest rates have had a devastating effect on families. Between 1991 
and 2007, the number of parents in prison increased by close to eighty per-
cent.172 During the same period, the number of children whose mothers were 
imprisoned increased by 131%.173 Since a majority of incarcerated mothers—
and a significant minority of incarcerated fathers—live with their children at 
the time of their arrest,174 their arrests can have an immediate impact on minor 
children.175  
Some local law enforcement officials have responded by taking measures 
to notify social services in the case of a known caretaker’s arrest.176 The notifi-
cation seeks to ensure that children are left with adequate care while the care-
taker is in police custody. This type of notification can provide a critically im-
portant early warning sign that a child might be at risk. Like most parents, ar-
arrested caretakers may have no plan in place for care of their minor children in 
case of an arrest. They may be unable to arrange for care after they have been 
taken into custody. Or they may be unwilling to discuss the need for a caretaker 
with the police, out of fear that their custody will be threatened. 
 
able at http://www.post.ca.gov/Publications/pdf/child_safety.pdf; DONNA PENCE & CHARLES 
WILSON, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE ROLE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE 
RESPONSE TO CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 3 (1992), available at http://www.childwelfare.gov 
/pubs/usermanuals/law/lawc.cfm; GINNY PUDDEFOOT & LISA K. FOSTER, CAL. RESEARCH 
BUREAU, CRB 07-006, KEEPING CHILDREN SAFE WHEN THEIR PARENTS ARE ARRESTED: LO-
CAL APPROACHES THAT WORK app. 2 at 45 (2007), available at http://www.library.ca.gov 
/crb/07/07-006.pdf; Responses to Children During a Parent’s Arrest, 29 CHILD. L. PRAC. 30, 
30-31 (2010). 
171. See, e.g., White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381, 383 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that the 
“unjustified and arbitrary refusal of police officers to lend aid to children endangered by the 
performance of official duty . . . indisputably breaches the Due Process Clause” where that 
refusal “ultimately results in physical and emotional injury to the children”).  
172. LAUREN E. GLAZE & LAURA M. MARUSCHAK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PARENTS IN 
PRISON AND THEIR MINOR CHILDREN 1 (2010). 
173. Id. at 2.  
174. Id. at 4. An estimated 35.5% of fathers lived with their minor children in the month 
before their arrest, and an estimated 42.4% of fathers lived with their children immediately 
prior to incarceration. See id. at 4 tbl.7. 
175. Roberts, supra note 48, at 1284 (“Incarcerating mothers tends to upset family life 
even more because inmate mothers were usually the primary caretakers of their children be-
fore entering prison.”). 
176. See ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., WHEN A PARENT IS INCARCERATED: A PRIMER FOR 
SOCIAL WORKERS 6 (2011) (noting that “[t]he potential for harm can be tragic” when local 
law enforcement officers fail to coordinate with social services and locate caregivers at the 
time of a parent’s arrest); CLARE M. NOLAN, CAL. RESEARCH BUREAU, CRB 03-011, CHIL-
DREN OF ARRESTED PARENTS: STRATEGIES TO IMPROVE THEIR SAFETY AND WELL-BEING 20 
(2003), available at https://www.library.ca.gov/crb/03/11/03-011.pdf (discussing notification 
protocols for law enforcement officers to follow when a child’s caretaker is arrested). 
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Reporting of arrests in the child protective services context is intended to 
provide timely information about whether a child is at risk for neglect. But even 
this compelling use of arrests can carry serious unintended consequences. An 
arrest that leads to nothing further in the criminal justice system may lead to 
lasting and unnecessary involvement with child protective services. Parents 
who are good caretakers, and who are arrested for minor offenses, may run the 
risk of having their custody disrupted. Consider the case of Penelope Harris, 
who was arrested after police discovered a third of an ounce of marijuana in her 
apartment. As a result of her arrest and the attendant notification to social ser-
vices, her ten-year-old son was placed in another home for over a week, and her 
niece, who lived with her as a foster child, was removed from her care and 
placed in another foster home for over a year.177 Arrests thus may exacerbate 
harmful effects of contact with the criminal justice system on children and may 
unnecessarily disrupt custody arrangements.  
3. Foster care 
In the foster care context, arrests are used to determine whether a house-
hold is a good placement for a foster child. Licensing agencies use initial back-
ground checks to determine whether a household will be a safe placement for a 
foster child. Some states require that adult household members submit to back-
ground checks, while others require background checks of even some juvenile 
household members.178 A household member’s subsequent arrest can trigger a 
reevaluation of whether the family remains a good placement. For the foster 
care system, the intent is to monitor households and prevent mistreatment of 
foster children, who are uniquely vulnerable to high rates of abuse and ne-
glect.179 This type of notification can be particularly valuable when licensing 
agencies have insufficient funding or resources to conduct in-home inspec-
tions.180 The use of arrests can provide an early warning sign that a home is po-
tentially unsafe for a child, but as with the social services context, it carries the 
risk of overbroad identifications.  
 
177. Mosi Secret, No Cause for Marijuana Case, but Enough for Child Neglect, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/18/nyregion/parents-minor 
-marijuana-arrests-lead-to-child-neglect-cases.html (describing the case of Penelope Harris). 
178. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR PROSPEC-
TIVE FOSTER AND ADOPTIVE PARENTS 4 n.10 (2011), available at https://www.childwelfare 
.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/background.pdf (“Missouri and New Hampshire re-
quire checks of all persons age 17 and older. Alaska, Connecticut, and Washington require 
checks of all persons age 16 and older. Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, and Texas require 
checks of all persons age 14 and older. Oklahoma requires a check of juvenile justice records 
for any child age 13 or older.”). 
179. Michael B. Mushlin, Unsafe Havens: The Case for Constitutional Protection of 
Foster Children from Abuse and Neglect, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 199, 205-07 (1988) 
(citing statistics that foster children are found to suffer from abuse and neglect at dispropor-
tionately high rates).  
180. See id. at 208-14 (discussing systemic agency failures to provide adequate moni-
toring and oversight of children in foster care).  
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4. Education 
Similar to how arrests operate in the social services context, police depart-
ments may notify schools about a juvenile’s contact with the criminal justice 
system. Some notifications are statutorily mandated,181 while others are discre-
tionary.182 The notification may be motivated by the desire to protect other stu-
dents or to identify the need for counseling or other interventions. But it may 
also have the effect of stigmatizing the student and undermining the confidenti-
ality of juvenile justice proceedings. Arrested students whose identities are dis-
closed may be subject to lasting stigma—precisely the result that sealing laws 
in the juvenile justice context are designed to guard against.183  
D. Conclusion 
In a variety of settings, noncriminal actors rely on arrests as a means of 
achieving their own regulatory agendas. This use of arrests can serve important 
societal interests. But it can come at a significant cost. It can magnify the effect 
of unwise or unjustified policing and arrest decisions. Across a number of set-
tings, arrests are an overbroad and imperfect proxy for the information that 
noncriminal justice actors value. This fact, combined with inadequate oversight 
and a lack of transparency in how arrest information is used, can create serious 
consequences for arrested individuals—ones that far outstrip any penalty im-
posed by the criminal justice system. In the next Part, I explore how criminal 
justice actors interact with others when they both rely on arrest information as 
the starting point for their enforcement decisions. 
III. ARRESTS, REGULATORY COOPERATION, AND REGULATORY CONFLICT  
When actors outside the criminal justice system rely on arrests, they have 
feedback effects on the criminal justice system. One potential effect is to ex-
pand the enforcement powers of both actors. When criminal justice actors co-
operate with others, they can engage in coordinated prosecutions that effective-
ly circumvent the checks of criminal procedure. Collaboration can provide 
opportunities for interrogation and enforcement that neither agency alone 
would be able to achieve.  
 
181. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-233h (2014) (requiring that the municipal police 
department notify the superintendent of schools within one business day if an enrolled stu-
dent aged seven through twenty is arrested for certain offenses); Packer v. Bd. of Educ., 717 
A.2d 117, 121 & n.4, 122 (Conn. 1998). 
182. See, e.g., Thompson v. Barnes, 200 N.W.2d 921, 923 (Minn. 1972) (discussing an 
officer’s decision to notify school officials of a student’s off-campus arrest for alcohol pos-
session). 
183. Kristin Henning, Eroding Confidentiality in Delinquency Proceedings: Should 
Schools and Public Housing Authorities Be Notified?, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 520, 527-28 (2004) 
(discussing the case of a student whose identity was protected in juvenile court but who was 
stigmatized by expulsion after a marijuana arrest).  
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At other times, however, noncriminal justice actors can work against cer-
tain criminal law enforcement goals. Conflict can potentially arise when non-
criminal justice actors attach causal consequences to arrests that criminal jus-
tice actors do not seek or desire—such as when they deport, evict, or discipline 
individuals after a demonstrably unlawful arrest. These consequences can un-
dermine the aims of prosecutors and police who seek to encourage witnesses to 
come forward and report crime. This Part describes how criminal justice actors 
and others interact in their use of arrest information and discusses the implica-
tions of these interactions for arrested individuals. 
A. Cooperative Relationships  
Criminal law actors and other actors may have shared regulatory interests 
and may choose to coordinate enforcement actions to their mutual benefit. Con-
sider the context of immigration enforcement. Both immigration enforcement 
officials and criminal law actors have a shared interest in identifying a “crimi-
nal alien”—someone who has committed criminal offenses and who is deporta-
ble.184 As a result of coordinated enforcement efforts, unlawful entrants are 
regularly criminally prosecuted prior to being deported, and a range of criminal 
convictions result in mandatory deportation.185 
Collaboration provides opportunities for agencies to pool resources and 
achieve levels of enforcement that neither would be able to achieve alone.186 In 
the immigration context, state and local police engage in raids and arrests in 
coordination with immigration enforcement officials,187 work with local police 
to identify suspected “criminal aliens,” such as gang members,188 and conduct 
 
184. In practice, the label “criminal alien” encompasses a variety of statuses. See Eagly, 
supra note 18, at 1137-40. 
185. See 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (2013) (making unlawful entry a misdemeanor); id. § 1546(a) 
(criminalizing the possession or use of a false immigration document); 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7) 
(2013) (criminalizing false representation of a Social Security number); Legomsky, supra 
note 19, at 476-78. 
186. For a discussion of this general dynamic, see Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 
COLUM. L. REV. 211 (2015).  
187. Julia Preston, Immigration Officials Arrest More than 3,100, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/03/us/immigration-officials-arrest-more-than-3100 
.html (discussing an operation by ICE that “involved arrests in all 50 states and was coordi-
nated with the local and state police”).  
188. See National Gang Unit: Operation Community Shield, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/community-shield (last visited Mar. 30, 2015) (describ-
ing Operation Community Shield, which is aimed at “[i]dentify[ing] violent street gangs and 
develop[ing] intelligence on their membership, associates, criminal activities and interna-
tional movements” and “[s]eek[ing] prosecution and/or removal of alien gang members from 
the United States”). For a critique of Operation Community Shield, see Jennifer M. Chacón, 
Whose Community Shield?: Examining the Removal of the “Criminal Street Gang Member,” 
2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 317, 320 (“No uniform legal standards govern the identification of 
criminal street gang members for purposes of ICE enforcement, and while the ‘associates’ of 
criminal street gang members are often removed, there are no legal standards defining who 
constitutes an associate of a criminal street gang member.”). 
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immigration screening out of prisons and jails.189 Criminal prosecutors rely on 
evidence gathered by immigration officials and conduct interrogations out of 
civil immigration detention facilities.190 This allows criminal prosecutors to re-
ly on deportation as a way to punish crime or suspected criminality, and to min-
imize the possibility that an unauthorized alien will commit repeat crimes over 
time.191  
The merger of certain aspects of immigration enforcement with criminal 
law—which Stephen Legomsky has aptly described as “asymmetric” in its in-
corporation of enforcement norms but its rejection of procedural constraints—
gives criminal law and immigration actors the opportunity to coordinate to 
achieve maximum enforcement.192 As Ingrid Eagly has demonstrated, certain 
criminal justice and immigration law actors engage in extensive coordination, 
from investigation, to arrest, to prosecution.193 For instance, immigration offic-
ers may deliberately elicit incriminating statements without Miranda warnings, 
knowing that those statements might subsequently be admitted in criminal 
court.194 Criminal law enforcement officers may decide to collect evidence un-
lawfully because they are aware that such evidence may be admitted in removal 
proceedings, regardless of whether it would be suppressed in criminal court.195 
Given their relatively lax procedural standards, immigration courts provide an 
alternative forum for proceeding against a noncitizen when prosecutors lack the 
evidence needed in criminal court. Noncitizen defendants in practice must nav-
 
189. Criminal Alien Program, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice 
.gov/criminal-alien-program (last visited Mar. 30, 2015). 
190. See Eagly, supra note 19, at 1308-17. 
191. Chacón, supra note 19, at 1574-75. 
192. Legomsky, supra note 19, at 472 (“Rather than speak of importation of the crimi-
nal justice model [to immigration enforcement], then, a more fitting observation would be 
that immigration law has been absorbing the theories, methods, perceptions, and priorities of 
the criminal enforcement model while rejecting the criminal adjudication model in favor of a 
civil regulatory regime.”); see also David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History 
in the War on Terrorism, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 3 (2003) (“[T]he government in-
vokes administrative processes to control, precisely so that it can avoid the guarantees asso-
ciated with the criminal process.”); Jennifer M. Chacón, Managing Migration Through 
Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 135, 146-47 (2009), http://www.columbialawreview 
.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/135_Chacon.pdf (discussing due process concerns in-
volved in the Postville prosecutions and in Operation Streamline).  
193. Eagly, supra note 19, at 1294, 1299-300. 
194. Id. at 1309-10 (providing examples of evidence obtained by immigration officers 
being used in criminal proceedings).  
195. The Supreme Court has held that since “a deportation hearing is intended to pro-
vide a streamlined determination of eligibility to remain in this country, nothing more,” un-
lawfully obtained evidence can be admitted. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1039 
(1984). There are limited exceptions to this rule, such as in the case of “egregious” Fourth 
Amendment violations. See Stella Burch Elias, “Good Reason to Believe”: Widespread 
Constitutional Violations in the Course of Immigration Enforcement and the Case for Revis-
iting Lopez-Mendoza, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 1109, 1125 (discussing different standards for 
“egregiousness”); see also Chacón, supra note 19, at 1615-19 (describing how Lopez-
Mendoza and other developments may incentivize state and local law enforcement officers to 
disregard certain procedural protections). 
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igate both systems at once.196 Their status as noncitizens can adversely affect 
their treatment in criminal court, such as by leading to the denial of bail.197 
Likewise, the existence of a criminal prosecution may adversely affect a noncit-
izen’s treatment in removal proceedings.198  
Similar dynamics operate in other contexts. A public housing tenant who 
fails to list all occupants in her apartment, or who fails to report an increase in 
her income, may not only be evicted, but also face criminal prosecution for 
crimes such as larceny and filing a false instrument.199 In the social services 
context, administrative agencies may mandate home inspections as a condition 
of receiving aid. If evidence of drug use or other legal violations is discovered 
during the inspection, that discovery may then form the basis for a criminal 
prosecution.200 Some state and local laws further facilitate collaboration. For 
instance, New York City allows criminal prosecutors to present evidence and 
seek evictions directly in housing court, even if a landlord refuses to proceed 
against a tenant.201 
Civil proceedings provide no access to free court-appointed counsel, no 
protection against self-incrimination, and generally apply less stringent proce-
dural standards than criminal court. Those who appear pro se and who testify 
run the risk that their testimony will be used against them in a later criminal 
proceeding.  
Collaboration between noncriminal and criminal justice actors can lead to 
important changes in the behavior of both actors. It may modify the way that 
criminal justice actors conduct interrogations, and it may give criminal justice 
actors incentives to gather unlawful evidence. The threat of a serious noncrimi-
 
196. See Eagly, supra note 19, at 1306-07. 
197. Chin, supra note 19, at 1423-24. 
198. Eagly, supra note 19, at 1305-20 (discussing how hybrid criminal and immigration 
prosecutions adversely affect noncitizen outcomes across a variety of contexts). 
199. McGregor Smyth, Bridging the Gap: A Practical Guide to Civil-Defender Collab-
oration, 37 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 56, 56 (2003) (discussing the case of a client named 
“Vicky G.”). 
200. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 323 (1971) (“The home visit is not a criminal in-
vestigation, [and] does not equate with a criminal investigation . . . . [I]f the visit should, by 
chance, lead to the discovery of fraud and a criminal prosecution should follow, . . . that is a 
routine and expected fact of life and a consequence no greater than that which necessarily 
ensues upon any other discovery by a citizen of criminal conduct.”). 
201. New York City’s Narcotics Eviction Program allows police officers and prosecu-
tors to pursue an eviction directly after obtaining a warrant for a home search if the landlord 
elects not to initiate eviction proceedings on his or her own. Escalera v. N.Y. Hous. Auth., 
924 F. Supp. 1323, 1330-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (discussing how the “Bawdy House” laws have 
been used by the Narcotics Eviction Program to lead to speedy evictions). For a discussion 
of the Narcotics Eviction Program, see Jeffrey Fagan et al., The Paradox of the Drug Elimi-
nation Program in New York City Public Housing, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 415, 
425 (2006) (describing the New York Police Department’s Anti-Narcotics Strike Force as 
receiving funding to “support special prosecution activities primarily to evict tenants with 
drug arrests”); Scott Duffield Levy, Note, The Collateral Consequences of Seeking Order 
Through Disorder: New York’s Narcotics Eviction Program, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
539, 545 (2008). 
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nal action—such as eviction or deportation—also gives prosecutors additional 
leverage in plea negotiations. Similarly, noncriminal justice actors may have 
incentives to conduct search and interrogation operations they would not oth-
erwise engage in, with the knowledge that their actions could be of use in crim-
inal proceedings—even if they will not be used in any other proceedings.  
Dynamics such as these produce considerable benefits for local law en-
forcement officers who coordinate with noncriminal enforcement agencies. 
They effectively expand the scope of each actor’s regulatory power by allowing 
access to additional personnel, more easily introduced evidence, and alternative 
forums for enforcement.  
B. Conflicting Interactions  
Just as criminal justice actors may cooperate with other actors, they may 
also come into conflict. Conflict arises because each institutional actor has its 
own regulatory agenda and its own goals. While some conflict is inevitable 
when different agencies pursue their own agendas, conflict can be particularly 
problematic in certain circumstances, such as when a crime victim or cooperat-
ing witness faces a steep civil consequence as an unforeseen result of an arrest.  
That is not to say that conflict is problematic from the perspective of local 
law enforcement whenever an arrested individual faces a civil consequence. In 
any individual case, a prosecutor may well be indifferent to whether an inno-
cent defendant faces a significant noncriminal penalty as the result of an arrest. 
Indeed, a prosecutor may seek harsher penalties if she is aware that the criminal 
defendant lacks immigration status or lives in public housing. Eagly has 
demonstrated that some prosecutors’ offices take exactly this approach in the 
immigration context.202 Criminal prosecutors in Maricopa County, Arizona, for 
instance, not only are less likely to exercise discretion if they are aware that a 
defendant does not have lawful immigration status, but in fact deliberately seek 
to structure prosecutions and plea agreements so as to maximize the likelihood 
of deportation.203 
Similarly, a jury could determine that an arrested noncitizen is not guilty of 
the charged criminal offense, but also believe, as a separate matter, that the 
noncitizen should be deported. A juror who believes that prison time is too 
harsh a punishment for the alleged offense might simultaneously believe that 
the arrested individual should not remain in her job, take in foster children, or 
live in a publicly subsidized apartment. 
The question of whether conflict arises in any given case depends in part 
on the local law enforcement agency’s own priorities. For instance, in the im-
 
202. See generally Eagly, supra note 18 (examining three prosecutors’ offices with re-
gard to their approach to immigration status, and arguing that they have distinct approaches 
to immigration status: alienage neutral, illegal-alien punishment, and immigration enforce-
ment).  
203. Id. at 1180-90.  
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migration context, does the agency actively seek to deport unauthorized noncit-
izens, or does it place primary emphasis on encouraging noncitizens to come 
forward and report crime? In the housing context, does a prosecutor’s office 
prioritize obtaining evictions as well as convictions—or is it indifferent to 
whether a conviction will affect public housing eligibility? Depending on the 
locality, police departments and prosecutors’ offices have reached very differ-
ent answers to these questions.  
In some cases, use of arrest information outside the criminal justice system 
can undermine the integrity of the criminal justice process and counter im-
portant criminal law enforcement aims. It can erode a community’s willingness 
to trust and cooperate with the police. Cultivating community cooperation is a 
persistent challenge for local law enforcement, particularly when minority 
communities are disproportionately arrested and have negative views of the 
criminal justice system.204 Between 2006 and 2010, over half of all violent 
crimes—about 3.4 million a year—were not reported to the police.205  
Criminal law actors vary in how they respond to these challenges. Some 
police departments and prosecutors’ offices ignore minor crime or seek mini-
mal punishment because they find existing criminal penalties to be unnecessari-
ly harsh and unfair.206 When actors outside the criminal justice system attach 
significant consequences to arrests—particularly unjustified and petty arrests—
they risk disrupting criminal law actors’ efforts to reach out to communities, 
cultivate witnesses, and tailor criminal law enforcement to community con-
cerns.207 
 
204. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan & Tracey L. Meares, Punishment, Deterrence and Social 
Control: The Paradox of Punishment in Minority Communities, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 173, 
218 (2008) (discussing procedural justice and fairness in perceptions of the police); Jason 
Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping Public 
Support for Policing, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 513, 518 (2003) (discussing the need for com-
munity cooperation with policing).  
205. Press Release, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Nearly 3.4 Million Violent Crimes per 
Year Went Unreported to Police from 2006 to 2010 (Aug. 9, 2012), http://www.bjs.gov 
/content/pub/press/vnrp0610pr.cfm. 
206. Bruce A. Green & Alafair S. Burke, The Community Prosecutor: Questions of 
Professional Discretion, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 285, 297 (2012) (describing some prose-
cutors as concerned with considerations about “whether [a] particular punishment would fit 
the crime and whether the ends of the criminal process can be adequately served without a 
conviction or imprisonment”); Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 14, at 636 (discussing how po-
lice can choose to ignore certain low-level offenses); see also Margaret H. Lemos, State En-
forcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698, 704 (2011) (“[T]he central goal of any 
system of law enforcement is to promote the right level of deterrence as efficiently as possi-
ble.”). 
207. For this reason, some prosecutors publicly support laws that would expunge crimi-
nal records, reasoning that criminal records should not serve as a bar to reentry after a prison 
term has been completed. See, e.g., Letter from Pa. Dist. Att’ys Ass’n to Senate Appropria-
tions Comm. (June 14, 2013) (“For ex-offenders, a criminal record can be a serious barrier to 
obtaining gainful employment and resuming life as a law-abiding citizen. Prosecutors recog-
nize that it is important that these individuals be able to find a job once they have paid their 
debt to society.”); see also Stephen Lee, De Facto Immigration Courts, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 
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Conflict may be particularly problematic from a law enforcement perspec-
tive when civil actors attach an undesired consequence to arrest, and that con-
sequence is perceived by community members to be directly and causally relat-
ed to the arrest. Conflict can change the deterrent effects of criminal law en-
enforcement, particularly in a way that erodes a community’s willingness to 
cooperate with the police. Suppose an exploitative employer hires undocument-
ed workers and then reports those who complain about wage theft to the police. 
If a local law enforcement agency prioritizes wage theft over unauthorized em-
ployment, the civil immigration decision effectively undermines the criminal 
law enforcement priority because the arrest itself may lead to deportation.208 
Similar outcomes arise in the domestic violence context, particularly where po-
lice have mandatory arrest policies that result in the arrest of both the victim 
and the alleged perpetrator.209 
The noncriminal use of arrests can be particularly problematic when it cre-
ates public policy outcomes that undermine the integrity of the criminal justice 
system. I consider four important dynamics below: the systemic penalization of 
crime victims; the systemic penalization of those who are subject to false ar-
rests; the disruption of important mechanisms of police oversight; and the lack 
of transparency and accountability with regard to the causal consequences of an 
arrest. 
1. Crime victims 
Some of the most troubling cases of conflict arise when a crime victim fac-
es a severe penalty as a result of her decision to report crime. Consider the case 
of Ruth Holiday, who was evicted after her son, Stanley, broke into her home. 
Holiday had previously obtained multiple orders of protection against Stanley, 
and she called the police when he arrived.210 She eventually received police 
assistance, but not before Stanley broke through two doors and forced his way 
inside.211 After the attack, Holiday pressed charges. The police report listed her 
as the victim, but also erroneously indicated that Stanley lived in Holiday’s 
apartment.212 
 
553, 582-83 (2013) (discussing how criminal prosecutors may find that the risk of deporta-
tion undermines their efforts to cultivate trust and cooperation with immigrant communities). 
208. Stephen Lee, Workplace Enforcement Workarounds, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
549, 564 (2012) (providing case studies of exploitative employers who reported undocu-
mented workers to local police). 
209. Kittrie, supra note 22, at 1451; Shankar Vedantam, Destined for Deportation?, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 2, 2010), http://wapo.st/1IL4jUV (discussing a Secure Communities 
identification of a domestic violence victim who was subject to a detainer after calling the 
police).  
210. Holiday v. Franco, 709 N.Y.S.2d 523, 524 (App. Div. 2000). 
211. Id. 
212. Id. 
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Three weeks later, Holiday received an eviction notice stating that she was 
in breach of her lease because Stanley, who was described as an “unauthorized 
occupant,” had been arrested and found with drugs.213 (Stanley was carrying 
cocaine when he broke into the apartment—a fact that had been noted in the 
police report.)  
Like most public housing tenants, Holiday did not have a lawyer, and she 
appeared pro se at the eviction proceeding.214 She then waived her right to go 
forward with the hearing, and instead stipulated to a one-year probation of her 
tenancy, to unannounced inspections, and to permanently bar Stanley from en-
try.215 One year later, unannounced inspectors found Stanley in the apart-
ment.216 According to Holiday, Stanley’s presence came as a surprise. Two of 
her children—neither of whom lived in the apartment—admitted him without 
her knowledge while she was at work.217 But she was in breach of the stipula-
tion and was evicted.218  
Holiday’s eviction represents a failure of the criminal justice system. If lo-
cal law enforcement officers want to encourage victims to come forward and 
report crime, they must protect those who do so from retaliation. In Holiday’s 
case, the eviction—following closely after her call to the police, and citing de-
tails found in the police report—functioned as a retaliatory penalty, one that 
would deter a similarly situated individual from calling the police or filing a 
police report in the future.  
But from the public housing perspective, Holiday was considered an evic-
tion priority. Crime in public housing is a serious problem.219 A landlord could 
view Holiday as an undesirable tenant because she might always be a magnet 
for Stanley.220 And as HUD itself has recognized, landlords routinely evict 
domestic violence victims who call the police or whose abusers cause property 
 
213. Id. (internal quotation mark omitted). 
214. Id. 
215. Id. 
216. Id. at 524-25. 
217. Id. 
218. Id. The Housing Authority’s eviction was eventually overturned after Holiday filed 
a lawsuit in state court. In a pre-Rucker decision, the court held that Holiday’s particular cir-
cumstances shocked the conscience. The court emphasized her absence of a criminal record, 
her twenty-year tenancy, her efforts to enforce the protective order against Stanley, the pres-
ence of a disabled child in the household, and the fact that for her, public housing was a 
home of “last resort.” Id. at 526. 
219. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 127 (2002) (discussing 
congressional findings of violence in public housing); Mireya Navarro & Joseph Goldstein, 
Policing the Projects of New York City, at a Hefty Price, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2013), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2013/12/27/nyregion/policing-the-projects-of-new-york-city-at-a-hefty 
-price.html (reporting that in 2013, twenty percent of New York City’s violent crimes took 
place in public housing projects, which house about five percent of city residents). 
220. Cf. Matthew Desmond & Nicol Valdez, Unpolicing the Urban Poor: Consequenc-
es of Third-Party Policing for Inner-City Women, 78 AM. SOC. REV. 117, 117-18 (2012) 
(finding that nearly one-third of nuisance property citations in Milwaukee during a two-year 
period originated in domestic violence incidents).  
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damage221—although such evictions can run afoul of antidiscrimination laws, 
the Violence Against Women Act, and HUD’s own regulatory guidelines.222 
Landlords may believe that tenants like Holiday are unlikely to succeed in 
keeping disruptive relatives away, and that it is therefore better to replace them 
with others from a long waitlist.223  
The criminal/noncriminal law interaction in Holiday’s case magnifies the 
effect of contact with the criminal justice system. Holiday was forced to cede 
significant privacy interests by agreeing to unannounced home inspections. 
Additionally, the stipulation will remain in effect after the criminal justice pro-
cess is complete, and regardless of whether Stanley is rehabilitated and be-
comes a source of support for his mother. Hector Monsegur, who was perma-
nently barred from his mother’s housing complex after completing his sentence 
for a drug-related felony, described the lasting effect of his arrest this way: 
“The courts let me do seven [years], but with them, it’s one strike and they give 
me life.”224 
2. Unlawful arrests 
Noncriminal justice actors can undermine the integrity of the criminal jus-
tice system when they attach consequences to false arrests. Consider the case of 
Charles Bradley, a lead plaintiff in a recent stop-and-frisk class action in New 
York City. Bradley, who worked as a security guard, was unlawfully arrested 
for trespass while on his way to visit his fiancée.225 Bradley’s arrest was de-
monstrably false; there was no probable cause. The arresting officer—who had 
a history of lying within the scope of his employment, and who admitted to 
having previously written a false summons to “help a friend”—also gave con-
 
221. Memorandum from Sara K. Pratt, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Enforcement & Pro-
grams, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., to FHEO Office Dirs. & FHEO Regional Dirs., 
Assessing Claims of Housing Discrimination Against Victims of Domestic Violence Under 
the Fair Housing Act (FHAct) and the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) (Feb. 9, 
2011), available at http://www.hud.gov/offices/fheo/library/11-domestic-violence-memo 
-with-attachment.pdf (acknowledging pervasive problems with the eviction of crime victims 
from public housing, with victims being evicted “after repeated calls to the police for domes-
tic violence incidents” and because of “property damage caused by their abusers”); see also 
Lapidus, supra note 23, at 381 (discussing how zero-tolerance or one-strike housing policies 
have a disparate impact on women). 
222. Memorandum from Sara K. Pratt, supra note 221.  
223. Id. at 6-7 (discussing evictions where landlords believe that a tenant will be unable 
to prevent a domestic abuser from disrupting the property); see also Meister v. Kan. City, 
Kan. Hous. Auth., No. 09-2544-EFM, 2011 WL 765887, at *1 (D. Kan. Feb. 25, 2011) (not-
ing that an eviction notice cited a domestic violence police report); Bouley v. Young-
Sabourin, 394 F. Supp. 2d 675, 678 (D. Vt. 2005) (“It is undisputed that, less than 72 hours 
after the plaintiff’s husband assaulted her, the defendant attempted to evict her [on the basis 
of breaching the lease].”). 
224. Manny Fernandez, Barred from Public Housing, Even to See Family, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 1, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/01/nyregion/01banned.html (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). 
225. Ligon v. City of N.Y., 925 F. Supp. 2d 478, 497-98 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
April 2015] ARRESTS AS REGULATION 853 
tradictory and implausible testimony about Bradley’s arrest.226 In particular, 
his testimony materially contradicted his arrest paperwork.227  
Because Bradley worked as a security guard, the arrest was automatically 
shared with the authority that issued his security guard license. In order to keep 
his license, Bradley was required to provide documentation of the status of his 
prosecution within a month of his arrest.228  
In Bradley’s case, the checks on the criminal justice system ultimately 
worked. The prosecutor agreed to drop the charges after Bradley’s fiancée pro-
vided evidence that he was her invited guest. His public defender advocated on 
his behalf with the prosecutor and with his licensing authority.229 The licensing 
authority agreed to an extension, and the prosecutor dropped the charges before 
his license was suspended.  
The outcome in Bradley’s case was by some measures a success. The pros-
ecutor made a reasoned judgment not to proceed, which allowed Bradley to 
avoid a license suspension. But obtaining this result required working against 
significant organizational barriers—ones that might well be insurmountable for 
the typical arrested individual in Bradley’s situation. First, the arrested individ-
ual may be alone in attempting to negotiate with a licensing agency. Criminal 
defense attorneys—particularly public defenders with heavy caseloads—face 
significant pressure to prioritize their work on criminal dockets. Relatively few 
defendants are able to obtain free legal assistance in negotiating civil conse-
quences related to arrests. 
Arrested individuals who attempt to mitigate civil consequences face sig-
nificant constraints. A typical arrested individual in Bradley’s situation would 
have no information from the criminal court that would allow him to demon-
strate that his arrest was baseless. In the short window Bradley was initially 
given to explain his arrest, he had no opportunity to take the police officer’s 
testimony or review his arrest paperwork, much less access the officer’s disci-
plinary history. In fact, a typical defendant in Bradley’s circumstances might 
not have ever received a criminal complaint. Bradley was given a Desk Ap-
pearance Ticket after his arrest—a time-saving mechanism that allows an ar-
rested individual to be released after booking, rather than waiting for arraign-
ment.230 The arraignment occurs at the first court appearance, often scheduled 
months later. But because the arrested individual does not have a criminal 
complaint that describes the circumstances of the arrest, he has limited ability 
to demonstrate to an employer that the charges are minor or unjustified.  
 
226. Id. at 498-99. 
227. Id. 
228. Complaint at 29, Ligon, 925 F. Supp. 2d 478 (No. 12-cv-02274), 2012 WL 
1031760. 
229. A Plaintiff Reflects on Judge Scheindlin’s Clean Halls Decision, BRONX DEFEND-
ERS (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.bronxdefenders.org/a-plaintiff-reflects-on-judge-scheindlins 
-clean-halls-decision. 
230. See N.Y.C. CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 41, at 10. 
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These dynamics raise the stakes of an arrest, separate and apart from how 
that arrest is treated in the criminal justice system. Such interactions can signif-
icantly undermine a community’s willingness to trust and cooperate with po-
lice. For arrested individuals, arrest decisions and their causal consequences are 
often not clear-cut. Police officers are the most visible government actors that 
certain communities encounter, and they are the ones likely to face legitimacy 
consequences if a community perceives the civil consequences of arrests to be 
excessively harsh or unfair. This possibility is particularly pronounced in com-
munities where residents live close together, such as in immigrant enclaves or 
in large public housing complexes.231  
3. Regulation of police 
Noncriminal consequences of arrests can undermine the ability of law en-
forcement officers to regulate policing decisions. An arrest needs only a single 
police officer’s determination of probable cause. When a police officer makes 
an arrest that is perceived as unfair or unjustified, other criminal justice actors 
have the ability—and an obligation—to dismiss that arrest. Prosecutors, in par-
ticular, wield significant oversight through charging discretion.232 Prosecutors’ 
enforcement choices can reflect their reasoned determination that an arrest 
lacks factual support, that the law is too harsh, or that “the application of that 
law to a particular defendant or in a particular context would be unwise or un-
fair.”233  
 
231. TASK FORCE ON SECURE CMTYS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FINDINGS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 24 (2011) (“When communities perceive that police are enforcing feder-
al immigration laws, especially if there is a perception that such enforcement is targeting mi-
nor offenders, that trust is broken in some communities, and victims, witnesses and other 
residents may become fearful of reporting crime or approaching the police to exchange in-
formation.”). 
232. Barkow, supra note 70, at 1048 (“The prosecutor acts with discretion that is almost 
unmatched anywhere in law.”); see also Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel 
and the Rise of Accuracy in Criminal Adjudication, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1585, 1599-600 
(2005) (describing prosecutors as playing an important screening function, one that is more 
rigorous when they are detached from an investigation). 
233. Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Prosecutorial Nullification, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1243, 1252 
(2011) (characterizing “‘prosecutorial nullification[]’ as those circumstances in which a 
prosecutor has sufficient evidence to secure a conviction against a defendant for conduct that 
violates a criminal law, but declines prosecution because of a disagreement with that law or 
because of the belief that the application of that law to a particular defendant or in a particu-
lar context would be unwise or unfair”); see also Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullifica-
tion: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 679-80 (1995) (dis-
cussing nullification in the context of juries).  
Prosecutors, of course, may decline to prosecute for other reasons as well, such as their 
pragmatic calculation that the evidence is insufficient to persuade a jury, or the crime is not 
significant enough to warrant taking resources away from another prosecution. 
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To the extent police officers regulate their behavior based on how arrest in-
formation is used,234 police may behave differently if they are aware that ar-
rests will be used for a civil purpose, even if they are not used for a criminal 
law enforcement purpose. For instance, police officers with the goal of detect-
ing unauthorized immigrants may be more likely to engage in unlawful search-
es and seizures if they expect that those searches will reveal immigration doc-
uments that will be admissible in removal proceedings, regardless of whether 
prosecutions will proceed in criminal court.235  
Hiroshi Motomura makes a related point, describing criminal prosecutors 
as having a “tempering” effect on police activity.236 When officers see that 
their arrests do not result in prosecution, Motomura argues, they modify their 
arrest behavior. Prosecutors thus exert a tempering effect on arrest decisions by 
giving cues about what types of arrests are worthwhile. But police officers who 
view immigration enforcement as part of their mission might view deportation 
as a “tangible result that makes the arrest worthwhile,” regardless of the out-
come in criminal court.237 Thus, police may have more of an incentive to ig-
nore the cues of criminal prosecutors if they perceive deportation as an alterna-
tive way of achieving law enforcement goals.  
4. Transparency 
Regulatory conflict can also inject additional opacity into the management 
of arrests, preventing arrested individuals from understanding which conse-
quences are imposed by the criminal justice system and which are imposed by 
other parties. Criminal justice outcomes, of course, are already shaped by a 
number of factors that are outside the control of an arrested individual. Factors 
such as the priorities of the local prosecutor’s office, the quality of defense 
counsel, and whether a case proceeds in state or federal court can play a signif-
icant role in how any particular defendant is treated.238  
 
234. Prosecutorial discretion may matter more in terms of setting long-term depart-
mental priorities, rather than governing any individual police officer’s behavior. See Chris-
topher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 
363, 377-78 (“[T]he sociological literature strongly suggests that the primary goal of officers 
in the field in the average case is to get a ‘collar.’ If they do, they’ve done their job. It is the 
prosecutor’s job to convict.” (footnotes omitted)). 
235. See David Gray et al., The Supreme Court’s Contemporary Silver Platter Doctrine, 
91 TEX. L. REV. 7, 35 (2012). 
236. Motomura, supra note 17, at 1847. 
237. Id. at 1843-47. 
238. Writing about the choice of federal or state jurisdiction, Sara Sun Beale argues that 
“[d]ual jurisdiction means that offenders are subject to a kind of cruel lottery, in which a 
small minority of the persons who commit a particular offense is . . . subjected to much 
harsher sentences—and often to significantly less favorable procedural or substantive stand-
ards—than persons prosecuted for parallel state offenses.” Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and 
Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the Proper Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 
46 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 997 (1995). 
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Noncriminal justice actors who attach causal consequences to arrests can 
magnify the sense that criminal justice outcomes are not transparent, and can 
obscure the work that the criminal justice system is doing.  
Assuming that an arrested individual has legal representation, the criminal 
defense attorney can explain to her client how her case will proceed if prose-
cuted in state versus federal court. But a criminal defense attorney may not be 
aware of, much less able to explain or negotiate, noncriminal justice conse-
quences stemming from arrests. As a result, arrested individuals may view their 
postarrest outcomes as a “cruel lottery,”239 but hold the arresting police officers 
or police department responsible for the causal consequences of the arrest, re-
gardless of whether the police have any knowledge or control over what fol-
lows. 
IV. EXERCISING OVERSIGHT OVER THE USE OF ARRESTS  
Arrests have significant consequences outside of the criminal justice sys-
tem. How should those consequences be regulated? Although police and prose-
cutors have enormous power to enforce the criminal law, their powers are con-
strained by the Constitution. Even when criminal procedure falls short—failing 
to give arrested individuals the right to a speedy day in court, adequate legal 
representation, and a meaningful opportunity to understand and contest the 
charges against them—it provides a yardstick for understanding how arrests 
should be used in the criminal justice system, and how they should not. But 
outside the criminal law context, similar standards do not apply, even though 
the stakes may be much higher for the arrested individual.  
Much work remains to be done in understanding how and when arrests 
should trigger regulatory decisions. Noncriminal justice actors do not necessari-
ly need to apply standards that are congruent to those of criminal procedure. 
Criminal law’s use of arrests differs from that of other actors in important 
ways. For one, noncriminal justice actors do not need to evaluate arrests at all. 
They rely on arrests because arrest data are readily available and because they 
regard arrests as a proxy for information they value—but not because arrests 
are necessary to making regulatory decisions. Noncriminal justice actors also 
have incentives to focus on their own priorities when using arrest information, 
rather than seeking more broadly to combat crime. 
Since noncriminal justice actors use arrests to achieve their own objectives, 
in practice, back-end administrative discretion provides a valuable way to man-
age the effects of arrests. This Part evaluates administrative discretion as a con-
flict-mediating tool, and argues that it is inadequate alone as a regulatory strat-
egy. Administrative discretion can fail to mitigate some of the most serious 
noncriminal consequences of arrests. This Part assesses administrative discre-
tion as a regulatory strategy, and preliminarily explores other alternatives, in-
 
239. Id. 
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cluding restricting how arrest information is used, and putting in place other 
oversight mechanisms.  
A. Administrative Discretion and Its Limits 
Noncriminal law actors necessarily exercise administrative discretion when 
they use arrest information. Discretion can be individualized—where civil au-
thorities make a back-end determination about how to proceed in a given 
case—or it can be systemic, where agencies set general enforcement priori-
ties.240 For instance, in the immigration context, general guidelines that priori-
tize the deportation of those with criminal convictions reflect systemic discre-
tion. Whether to deport any particular noncitizen—taking into account factors 
such as whether the noncitizen is considered an administrative priority and 
whether mitigating circumstances, such as the presence of U.S. family ties, 
counsel in favor of exercising discretion—reflects individualized discretion. 
Discretionary enforcement decisions are context-specific. In the context of 
immigration enforcement, authorities must determine whether a noncitizen is 
legally removable, and then decide on a discretionary basis whether to proceed 
with deportation. In the context of public housing and licensing, the arrested 
individual has a legal entitlement to remain in her home or retain her license, 
and is entitled to due process before an eviction or a license revocation. The ar-
rest serves as the starting point for a fact-based legal inquiry: Is the arrested in-
dividual in breach of her lease agreement, or has she met the criteria for a li-
cense revocation? After making a threshold legal determination, noncriminal 
law authorities also take into account equitable considerations. Public housing 
authorities exercise equitable discretion by looking at factors such as the seri-
ousness of the offense, who would be affected by eviction, and whether there 
are other alternatives to achieving a similar result (for instance, whether the 
household is willing to bar the arrested individual from entry).241 
Like unauthorized immigrants, at-will employees who lack legal entitle-
ments to remain in their jobs can be removed at any time. Employers who rely 
on arrests may take into account equitable factors when deciding whether to 
 
240. See Gerald L. Neuman, Discretionary Deportation, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 
612-18 (2006) (distinguishing between rule-based discretion and administrative discretion). 
Motomura makes a similar distinction between macro-discretion (“when agencies and offi-
cials set enforcement priorities and support them with funds”) and micro-discretion (“when 
agencies and officials decide whether or not to pursue the removal of a noncitizen after she 
has been identified as . . . removable”). HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE 
LAW 129 (2014).  
241. Letter from Michael M. Liu to Pub. Hous. Dirs., supra note 151; cf. Letter from 
Shaun Donovan, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., and Carol J. Galante, Acting As-
sistant Sec’y for Hous.—Fed. Hous. Comm’r, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., to Private 
Owners & Agents of HUD-Assisted Properties (n.d.), available at http://nhlp.org/files/HUD 
%20Letter%203.14.12.pdf (calling on landlords to set discretionary admission policies that 
balance the need for safety against the interests of allowing family reunification when con-
sidering admission of those with criminal records).  
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take adverse employment action, such as the length of the employee’s service. 
But they may place equal or greater weight on factors such as how easy the 
worker is to replace and the cost of conducting an inquiry. 
Across the board, administrative discretion plays an important role in me-
diating the consequences of an arrest. Courts also attach significance to admin-
istrative discretion. In Rucker, the existence of back-end discretion itself—
regardless of whether discretion was actually applied in practice—played a key 
role in the Court’s decision to uphold the one-strike eviction policy.242 Similar-
ly, the Supreme Court emphasized the role of discretionary authority in its 2012 
decision upholding one portion of Arizona’s Senate Bill 1070 immigration 
law.243 The absence of discretion has likewise been central to decisions striking 
down certain mandatory consequences based on arrests.244 
Administrative discretion thus plays an important role in mediating the 
consequences of arrests. But administrative discretion alone is inadequate to 
avoid the most problematic instances of regulatory conflict. One persistent cri-
tique of administrative discretion is that it is prone to error, or applied incon-
sistently or unfairly.245 Administrative agencies may not rigorously examine 
facts that counsel in favor of discretion. In the housing context, domestic vio-
lence victims or those who are charged with only minor crimes have been 
evicted or denied access to housing, despite HUD guidance to the contrary.246 
 
242. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 133-34 (2002). 
243. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012). In upholding the portion of 
the law that authorized police officers to verify immigration status during the course of a 
stop or arrest—known colloquially as the “papers please” provision—Justice Alito’s separate 
opinion emphasized that even if Arizona police officers conducted immigration checks, the 
federal government ultimately retained the discretion over whether to act on that infor-
mation. Id. at 2526-27 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“At bottom, the 
discretion that ultimately matters is not whether to verify a person’s immigration status but 
whether to act once the person’s status is known. . . . [T]he Federal Government retains the 
discretion that matters most—that is, the discretion to enforce the law in particular cases.”); 
see also MOTOMURA, supra note 240, at 130 (discussing the importance of federal immigra-
tion enforcement discretion to the holding in Arizona v. United States). For a discussion of 
the Court’s preemption analysis with respect to this provision of S.B. 1070, see Kerry 
Abrams, Plenary Power Preemption, 99 VA. L. REV. 601, 626-32 (2013). 
244. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 119 F. Supp. 2d 735, 736, 740 (S.D. Ohio 
2000) (striking down a law banning persons from entering “drug exclusion zones” for ninety 
days following a drug-related arrest, in part because there was no “case-by-case” determina-
tion by courts over whether the individual ought to be excluded); State ex rel. Okla. State 
Bureau of Investigation v. Warren, 975 P.2d 900, 904 (Okla. 1998) (striking down a licens-
ing law that banned applying for a concealed weapons permit for three years after certain 
arrests, based in part on the blanket nature of the ban). 
245. This is particularly true when enforcement agencies rely on private actors and oth-
ers to conduct front-line screening. See Stephen Lee, Private Immigration Screening in the 
Workplace, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1109-10 (2009) (arguing that instead of exercising regu-
latory discretion, employers who are delegated immigration enforcement authority instead 
collude with undocumented workers and selectively report those who complain of labor vio-
lations).  
246. See, e.g., Carey, supra note 131, at 567-68 (discussing public housing denials for 
nonviolent crime, such as writing bad checks). 
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Likewise, advocates point to U.S. citizens who have been wrongly placed in 
removal proceedings.247  
But assuming that noncriminal justice actors make a sustained effort to en-
force their own administrative priorities, back-end discretion alone still falls 
short. As a regulatory strategy, back-end discretion privileges the interests of 
the noncriminal justice actor over others. Noncriminal law enforcement offi-
cials may have an institutional interest in collecting a broad swath of infor-
mation, even when they are aware that the arrest may be inaccurate or insignifi-
cant. They then use their own discretionary process to selectively target certain 
arrested individuals. This approach may benefit the civil actor by providing the 
most flexibility. Local law enforcement agencies, on the other hand, may value 
a system of front-end rules. Prosecutors and other criminal law actors may val-
ue the ability to tell community members with certainty that an arrest alone will 
not lead to deportation, eviction, or employment consequences.  
Second, the exercise of back-end administrative discretion can be exceed-
ingly opaque. Measured in terms of transparency—“the ease with which the 
public can discern both the outcome of legal decisions and the inputs that lead 
to such decisions”248—administrative agencies can provide minimal transpar-
ency of process. “Transparency of process depends on the ability of the public 
to know that an issue is being considered, to be involved in the decisionmaking 
process, to know who else is involved and in what ways, and to understand how 
a final decision is reached.”249 Administrative agencies that rely on arrests vary 
greatly in terms of their openness; some provide publicly accessible statistics 
about their enforcement choices, while others do not.250 There is even less ac-
countability for private actors, such as employers, who rely on arrest infor-
mation.  
Accurate information about how arrests are used can thus be difficult to 
find, particularly when arrested individuals have no legal counsel. And even the 
presence of legal counsel may do little to mitigate the effects of an arrest out-
side the criminal justice system. Criminal defense attorneys now have an obli-
gation to advise their clients about certain civil consequences of criminal con-
victions251 but face no similar constitutional obligation to advise clients about 
the consequences of an arrest alone. On a practical level, when criminal defense 
 
247. See, e.g., Esha Bhandari, Yes, the U.S. Wrongfully Deports Its Own Citizens, AM. 
CIV. LIBERTIES UNION BLOG RTS. (Apr. 25, 2013, 11:48 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog 
/immigrants-rights/yes-us-wrongfully-deports-its-own-citizens (discussing U.S. citizens mis-
takenly identified for removal through Secure Communities); William Finnegan, The Depor-
tation Machine, NEW YORKER (Apr. 29, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013 
/04/29/the-deportation-machine. 
248. Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption, 
Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 1949 (2008). 
249. Id. 
250. For instance, ICE publishes data on Secure Communities removals, while HUD 
does not provide comparable statistics about how many evictions follow from arrest reports. 
251. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 360 (2010). 
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attorneys voluntarily assume the additional work of attempting to negotiate 
noncriminal consequences, they may have no access to timely, relevant infor-
mation that will allow them to engage in effective advocacy. 
Likewise, some arrested individuals may only have knowledge of the ulti-
mate regulatory decision, such as license suspension, deportation, or eviction, 
but have no knowledge about the process that led to that decision, other than 
the fact of their arrest. Regulatory opacity can undermine strategic decisions 
made by law enforcement officers, particularly decisions designed to encourage 
immigrant crime victims and witnesses to come forward.  
Third, the efficacy of back-end discretion is constrained by idiosyncratic 
timing and procedure. Even when immigration enforcement officials and others 
are willing to exercise discretion in favor of crime victims, witnesses, or the 
wrongfully arrested, they may face persistent barriers to gathering timely in-
formation. An arrested individual might be deported before he has a meaningful 
opportunity to demonstrate that he was wrongfully arrested. And as Bradley’s 
case demonstrates, license suspension or other consequences may occur before 
any meaningful activity has taken place in the criminal justice process. 
Fourth, even if noncriminal actors exercise back-end discretion, they con-
tinue to delegate front-end enforcement discretion to police officers. Noncrimi-
nal justice actors who rely on arrests do not screen a random population; they 
screen those whom local law enforcement officers decide to arrest. These dy-
namics magnify the effects of relatively minor policing decisions on the poor 
and on racial minorities, who are the most likely to be arrested.252 By relying 
on arrests, noncriminal justice actors exacerbate the racial and class-based dy-
namics that undergird arrest decisions. 
Finally, knowledge of the arrest itself can skew how noncriminal justice 
actors exercise discretion. In the immigration context, Motomura develops a 
thoughtful analysis of how delegating enforcement discretion to police officers 
shapes immigration enforcement decisions. Motomura writes: “[A]n individual 
unauthorized migrant’s chances of arrest are very low. Once arrested, however, 
the chances are high that the federal government will move to deport or even 
criminally prosecute. Arrest discretion has by far the greatest effect on out-
comes.”253 Motomura estimates that of unauthorized migrants who are arrest-
ed, sixty-five to ninety-five percent are prosecuted and forced to depart.254  
 
252. Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 YALE 
L.J. 2176, 2183 (2013) (“The spaces that poor people, especially poor African Americans, 
live in receive more law enforcement in the form of police stops and arrests.”); Howell, su-
pra note 14, at 291 (“[A]bout 86% of people arrested for misdemeanors in New York City in 
the years 2000-2005 were nonwhite. About 48-50% were reported to be black and another 
32-34% Hispanic.” (footnote omitted)); Motomura, supra note 17, at 1857 (discussing how 
racial profiling can skew immigration policies that rely on arrests); Pinard, supra note 29, at 
967-68 (noting that African Americans and Latinos are disproportionately arrested); Smyth, 
supra note 199, at 58 (citing statistics that approximately ninety percent of indigent defend-
ants in the Bronx, New York, are African American or Latino). 
253. MOTOMURA, supra note 240, at 130.  
254. Id.  
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The discretion to arrest has thus been “the discretion that matters” in immi-
gration removal decisions.255 This trend can be explained in light of immigra-
tion enforcement officials’ institutional concerns. When immigration enforce-
ment officials select which unauthorized noncitizens to remove, they decide 
from a caseload that has already been shaped by arrest decisions.256 Once im-
migration enforcement officials are made aware of the presence of an unauthor-
ized noncitizen, they also have important institutional incentives to proceed 
with deportation. It is one thing for immigration enforcement officials not to 
proactively invest resources in finding and deporting some subset of the na-
tion’s 11.1 million unauthorized noncitizens; it is another to ignore those who 
have been arrested and actively brought to the attention of immigration en-
forcement officials. When immigration officials ignore an arrested unauthor-
ized immigrant, they run the risk of backlash, particularly if that noncitizen is 
subsequently arrested for another reason.257  
Other actors face similar concerns. For instance, an employer who is aware 
of a worker’s arrest—particularly a worker who operates independently much 
of the time, such as a home health care worker or a taxi driver—may face a 
heightened risk of liability if it knew of an employee’s arrest and ignored signs 
that the employee was potentially negligent or otherwise posed a risk.258 Back-
end administrative discretion thus does not operate independently of the arrest 
decision; arrest information channels and narrows the grounds for exercising 
discretion.  
B. Other Policy Alternatives 
Once noncriminal justice actors are aware of arrests, they face significant 
pressures to take adverse actions. At the same time, they often receive inade-
quate information to allow for the meaningful exercise of equitable discretion. 
That raises the question of whether arrest information should be broadly acces-
sible to noncriminal justice actors, particularly for minor subfelony arrests. 
While the appropriate use and regulation of arrest information is a considerably 
broad topic that cannot be adequately explored here, I raise two possibilities for 
how to create more transparency and procedural fairness in the use of arrest in-
formation. First, arrest sharing itself can be restricted. Second, other actors, 
such as criminal defense attorneys, prosecutors, or independent third parties, 
 
255. Motomura, supra note 17, at 1822, 1833-34 (arguing that arrest discretion plays a 
key role in shaping deportation decisions).  
256. MOTOMURA, supra note 240, at 231. 
257. Id. (“[O]nce state or local officers identify and detain an unauthorized migrant, any 
federal decision not to seek removal will prompt much more political exposure and criticism 
than the systemic, macro-level discretionary federal decisions that make arrests more or less 
likely in the first place.”). 
258. See NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, supra note 10, at 36 (discussing the 
role of negligent hiring torts in leading employers to rely on background checks). 
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can make concerted efforts to evaluate and address the noncriminal uses of ar-
rests.   
1. Restrict arrest sharing 
The simplest way to address the effects of arrests outside the criminal jus-
tice system is to limit arrest sharing, including by automatically expunging ar-
rests immediately after charges are dropped, and by restricting the dissemina-
tion of open arrest information outside of the criminal justice system. Today, 
precisely because arrest records are disseminated widely and stored in a num-
ber of databases, regulatory agencies and private actors who want to access ar-
rest information generally have a number of options for obtaining it.259 Arrest 
information can be obtained directly from criminal justice agencies or from 
private sources, which may be more prone to error.260 In states that do not au-
tomatically seal arrests that do not result in a conviction, arrest records are 
available long after the charges are dismissed, and require considerable effort to 
expunge.261 And even jurisdictions that do automatically expunge arrests do so 
at the time of dismissal,262 which allows arrest information to be shared while 
the arrest is open and pending. 
Legislators who restrict the use of arrest information will need to react to 
the many ways that arrests are used outside the criminal justice sphere. This 
will require a willingness to work against a tendency to frame crime in the ab-
stract. As Joseph Kennedy argues, lawmakers tend to think of the most severe 
forms of crime, rather than examining how an arrest may affect an “ordinary” 
arrested individual.263 They are also unlikely to consider how arrests alone can 
lead to adverse consequences that outstrip any penalties imposed by the crimi-
nal justice system. Lawmakers who pay greater attention to how arrest infor-
mation is actually transmitted, and to whether arrested individuals have mean-
ingful opportunities to respond, may well choose to restrict the noncriminal 
uses of arrests, even though doing so may mean denying noncriminal justice 
actors access to information that they believe is relevant and valuable for their 
own decisionmaking.  
 
259. Jacobs & Crepet, supra note 71, at 210-11.  
260. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 78, at 2 (noting that most private employers 
conduct background searches through private enterprises or through commercial databases 
that aggregate criminal records that are available to the public from government agencies). 
261. See, e.g., SHARON M. DIETRICH, CMTY. LEGAL SERVS. OF PHILA., EEOC’S CRIMI-
NAL RECORD GUIDANCE ONE YEAR LATER: LESSONS FROM THE COMMUNITY 4-5 (2013).  
262. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 160.50 (McKinney 2014) (requiring that dis-
missed criminal charges be sealed). 
263. Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity Through 
Modern Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 829, 830 (2000) (arguing that when people consider 
crime in the abstract, they focus on the worst offenders, rather than understanding that 
crimes are also defined in a way that encompasses relatively minor behavior).  
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Because arrest information is already widely available, thoughtful com-
mentators question whether it is viable at this point to restrict arrest sharing.264 
There are, however, important examples where arrest information has been 
sealed and the identities of arrested individuals have been protected. Juvenile 
records provide one precedent. While sealing in the juvenile context is imper-
fect—with exceptions for educational providers and others—it provides an im-
portant example of lawmakers choosing to protect the identities of arrested in-
dividuals from widespread dissemination, notwithstanding potential benefits 
from disclosure.265  
Short of restricting the use of arrests, lawmakers can also promote trans-
parency with how arrest information is used and stored. Even limited chang-
es—such as timely disclosures about how and when arrest information is dis-
seminated—may help arrested individuals and their counsel have more 
meaningful opportunities to contest the facts of their arrests. Greater transpar-
ency about the effects of arrests will also promote accountability and may 
prompt noncriminal justice actors to more narrowly tailor their use of arrests. 
Lawmakers can also encourage or mandate that noncriminal actors provide 
publicly available and easily accessible information about their use of arrests, 
including information about what types of arrest charges will be evaluated, the 
purpose and timing of the evaluation, the relevant decisionmakers, and any ap-
peals process.266 
2. Exercise oversight   
Another way to mitigate the noncriminal consequences of arrests is for 
other actors, either within or outside of the criminal justice system, to exercise 
oversight over the effects of arrests.  
Criminal defense attorneys are an obvious choice. Some defense attorneys 
already make efforts to attempt to inform defendants of how their arrest may be 
used outside of the criminal context.267 A number of organizations encourage 
defense attorneys to engage in systemic efforts to address noncriminal conse-
quences, and provide resources to help them do so.268 Interventions by defense 
attorneys can be an important way to mitigate some adverse consequences of 
 
264. See, e.g., Jacobs & Crepet, supra note 71, at 211 (arguing that it is now too late to 
place confidence in policies designed to limit access to criminal records, because “[t]he in-
formational infrastructure is too large, too entrenched, and too useful to too many people to 
make its contraction even a remote possibility”). 
265. See generally Henning, supra note 183, at 522-24 (discussing juvenile arrest seal-
ing, its motivation, and certain exceptions in public housing and education).  
266. For a discussion of these types of changes in the context of criminal convictions, 
see NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, supra note 10, at 30-42, 54. 
267. See, e.g., Smyth, supra note 13, at 480 (providing a roadmap for how criminal de-
fense attorneys can advise clients about collateral consequences and seek outcomes that mit-
igate their effects). 
268. See, e.g., BRONX DEFENDERS, supra note 87, at 9; NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. 
LAWYERS, supra note 13, at 62. 
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arrests. In Bradley’s case, for instance, his defense attorney played a critical 
role in preventing his license suspension while his criminal case was proceed-
ing.269 But defense attorneys also face significant barriers to attempting to ad-
dress the consequences of arrests. They frequently lack access to relevant in-
formation that would allow them to understand how an arrest might impact an 
arrested individual’s job or housing situation. And defense attorneys who are 
already vastly overburdened with criminal caseloads have limited ability to at-
tempt to mitigate noncriminal consequences.270 
Another possibility is for criminal prosecutors to play a larger role in eval-
uating the consequences of arrests outside the criminal justice system. Prosecu-
tors already evaluate cases and make determinations about whether an arrest is 
justified. They may also have an ethical duty in some cases to work with 
wrongfully arrested individuals to mitigate the noncriminal consequences of 
their arrests.  
One change that prosecutors’ offices can make is to evaluate arrests rela-
tively early and dismiss meritless arrests.271 Prosecutors have the ethical obli-
gation to seek justice, rather than to routinely pursue convictions.272 But prose-
cutors also have strong competing institutional incentives to focus narrowly on 
the work of seeking convictions or, more routinely, seeking plea bargains. 
Prosecutors have professional incentives to collect “wins,”273 and some prose-
cutors perceive it to be in their interest to book suspects and to keep an arrest 
open, even if they ultimately intend to drop the charges prior to trial.274 Rela-
tively few prosecutors engage in early screening of arrests.275  
Absent external motivation, prosecutors’ offices are more likely to dismiss 
cases early if they perceive it to be in their interest to do so. For instance, after 
widespread attention to unlawful stops and arrests, the Bronx District Attor-
ney’s Office adopted a default policy of not prosecuting public housing trespass 
arrests unless the prosecutor first interviewed the police officer and was satis-
fied that there was a basis for the charges.276 Prosecutors designed the policy 
after repeatedly determining that police officers engaged in unlawful arrests 
 
269. A Plaintiff Reflects on Judge Scheindlin’s Clean Halls Decision, supra note 229. 
270. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 58, at 1096-97 (describing excessive workloads 
faced by public defenders).  
271. See Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. 
L. REV. 29 (2002) (arguing in favor of early prosecutorial screening).  
272. Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 2464, 2470 (2004). 
273. Id. at 2471. 
274. See Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 14, at 614, for an argument that prosecutors and 
other agents in the criminal justice system use arrest information to monitor arrested individ-
uals over time.  
275. Wright & Miller, supra note 271, at 104 (noting that early prosecutorial screening 
“run[s] against deep-seated habits and traditions of prosecutors”). 
276. Joseph Goldstein, Prosecutor Deals Blow to Stop-and-Frisk Tactic, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/26/nyregion/in-the-bronx-resistance-to 
-prosecuting-stop-and-frisk-arrests.html.  
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and falsified arrest reports. The interview requirement changes the default re-
sult; a case will be dropped unless the prosecutor determines that the officer’s 
account is credible. The interview requirement also speeds the process of dis-
missing cases because the prosecutor must make a charging decision or drop 
the charges within forty-eight hours of the arrest.  
With this policy, arrest information will still be entered into the law en-
forcement database and create a criminal record that will be transmitted to other 
actors. But the early dismissal can allow arrested individuals to more quickly 
demonstrate to an employer or other actor that the arrest was not significant, 
and that they should not be suspended or face other adverse action.  
Prosecutors can also engage in a more coordinated response with other ac-
tors, some of whom implicitly expect prosecutorial cooperation. For instance, 
the New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission allows suspended taxi 
drivers to return to work prior to the dismissal of arrest charges if a prosecutor 
explains that the criminal charges will be dropped.277 Similarly, immigration 
enforcement officials implicitly relied on prosecutorial intervention when they 
implemented guidelines designed to prevent the deportation of crime victims or 
witnesses.278 This approach combines back-end administrative discretion with 
the assumption of prosecutorial intervention; noncriminal justice authorities as-
sume that a prosecutor’s office will provide the information necessary to show 
that the arrested individual is entitled to discretion.  
This approach, however, has serious flaws. It is not at all clear that prose-
cutors are willing to reach out to employers, licensing authorities, or immigra-
tion officials to explain why that actor should not proceed with its enforcement 
decision. Some prosecutors may seek harsher penalties if they are aware of the 
noncriminal consequence; they may actively seek deportation or other civil 
consequences as a tangible outcome of a prosecution.279 Similarly, prosecutors 
who are aware of a potential noncriminal consequence might view that conse-
quence as an additional leverage point in plea negotiations. Thus, any particular 
prosecutor’s willingness to negotiate civil consequences is constrained by how 
that prosecutor’s office defines its institutional role. 
Prosecutors may be willing to work to mitigate certain consequences when 
they have a vested interest in the outcome. For instance, some prosecutors may 
make efforts to mitigate civil consequences if a defense attorney asks for inter-
vention as part of plea negotiations and offers something in return.280 Similar-
ly, if prosecutors have an independent reason to keep in touch with the arrested 
individual, such as in the case of an arrestee who becomes a cooperating wit-
 
277. See Nnebe v. Daus, 665 F. Supp. 2d 311, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d in part, va-
cated in part, 644 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2011). 
278. See Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs En-
forcement, to All Field Office Dirs. et al., Prosecutorial Discretion for Certain Victims, Wit-
nesses, and Plaintiffs (June 17, 2011).   
279. See Eagly, supra note 18, at 1180-90. 
280. Lee, supra note 207, at 578-80 (offering examples of criminal prosecutors who 
took immigration consequences into account during plea negotiations). 
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ness, they may make efforts on a case-by-case basis to mitigate the civil conse-
quences of arrests. But in the typical case, a prosecutor may well be unaware of 
the civil consequence or unwilling to intervene unless she perceives an imme-
diate institutional interest in doing so. For this approach to be effective, non-
criminal justice actors who rely on prosecutorial discretion need to ensure that 
prosecutors are willing to fully assess cases and to contact administrative au-
thorities if they choose not to proceed with a prosecution.  
Given that neither criminal nor noncriminal justice actors have incentives 
to fully consider the effects of arrests outside the criminal justice system, an in-
dependent third party tasked with oversight might be a more promising option. 
Putting in place reporting requirements to a third party would itself be a signifi-
cant step forward in promoting transparency and accountability. A third par-
ty—one that is not committed to either the goals of criminal law enforcement 
actors or to the interests of the noncriminal actor—may be in the best position 
to systemically evaluate considerations such as whether the underlying arrest 
information is accurate, whether it provides a meaningful informational proxy, 
whether it disproportionately affects certain groups, whether the evaluation 
process is fair and transparent, and whether the use of arrests has undesirable or 
unintended public policy consequences. 
CONCLUSION 
When actors outside the criminal justice system rely on arrests, they dele-
gate front-end screening discretion to individual police officers and magnify the 
effects of arrest decisions. Across a number of spheres, noncriminal justice ac-
tors envision regulating particular types of people: they want to find the “crimi-
nal alien” who commits felonies; the tenant who deals drugs and makes his 
neighbors less safe; the worker who should not be placed in a position of trust; 
or the student who poses a risk to herself and to others. Arrests can be a valua-
ble tool in meeting these objectives. But using arrests in this way comes with a 
significant cost, as it necessarily reaches well beyond these priorities. When ac-
tors outside the criminal justice system look at arrests as a whole, they over-
whelmingly examine subfelony arrests and arrests that do not result in convic-
tion. They magnify the effects of underlying and problematic police practices 
based on racial profiling. Regulatory decisions based on such arrests can carry 
devastating costs for arrested individuals and for the criminal justice system as 
a whole.  
Noncriminal justice actors who rely on arrests are driven by their own or-
ganizational priorities, and they take an instrumental view of arrests—one that 
is at odds with the principle that an arrest alone is not indicative of guilt. They 
also respond to organizational incentives to conduct broad-based screening, 
even if there is no reason to believe that a particular type of arrest will correlate 
well with the civil actor’s objectives. 
In taking this approach, noncriminal justice actors systemically privilege 
their own interests above other important concerns. This creates a compelling 
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need to understand how arrests regulate individuals outside the criminal justice 
sphere, and to evaluate when and whether it is appropriate to allow an individu-
al police officer’s decision to arrest to do so much work. 
